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THE CONTENT SHOP: TOWARD AN
ECONOMIC LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR
CLEARING AND LICENSING MULTIMEDIA
CONTENT
The magic of myth and legend has come true in our time.
One types the correct incantation on a keyboard, and a
display screen comes to life, showing things that never were
nor could be.'
I. INTRODUCTION
With $529 million CD-ROM revenues in the first half of 1995,2
multimedia is confirmed as an established industry. It is, in one
important respect, unique: it is an industry of borrowing. Like a
quilt maker, the multimedia producer patches together pieces of
other works, the fabric of other art stitched together as a new
whole.' To be sure, some producers, like weavers, have the ability
to fashion a finished quilt from whole cloth, but the whole-cloth
quilt, like the completely original multimedia product, is a luxury.4
Most, and some of the best, creations are built from a network of
others' art.'
The definition of multimedia has caused a lot of confusion. In
the 1970s and early 1980s "multimedia presentations" were very
1. FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., The Tar Pit, in THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH:
ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 7,7-8 (1975).
2. Sean Silverthorne, Measuring Multimedia, PC WEEK INSIDE, Dec. 18, 1995, at
A12(1).
3. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 4 (2d ed. 1996).
4. See Allen R. Grogan, Acquiring Content for New Media Works: The Rights and
Acquisition Process and Contract Drafting Considerations, in MULTIMEDIA AND THE
LAW 1996: PROTECrING YOUR CLIENTS' INTERESTS 257, 268-69 (PLI Patents, Copy-
rights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-428, 1996)
[hereinafter MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW 1996].
5. For example, the Compton's CD-ROM Encyclopedia contains "5,200 full articles,
26,023 concise capsule articles, 63,503 entries in a fact-index, 65,000 entries in a full data-
base dictionary, 1,500 glossary terms, a thesaurus, and 15,000 graphics comprising photo-
graphs, charts, diagrams and animation." RICHARD RAYSMAN, MULTIMEDIA LAW:
FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 1.01[2] n.5 (1996).
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fancy slide shows using several projectors, lights, a sound track,
and possibly live action or narration. The dictionary still reflects
this perception of multimedia when it defines multimedia as the
combined use of several media in a single presentation such as an
educational presentation using slides, music, film, and lights.6 The
White Pape7 addresses some of this confusion. Calling multimedia
a "misnomer" it notes that in these works, "it is the types or cate-
gories of works that are 'multiple' or 'mixed'-not the types of
media," which like a CD-ROM, are singular!
Multimedia has evolved into a technical term that defines
both an industry and that industry's products. One author defines
multimedia as "interactive audiovisual computing,"9 but it is more.
It usually means a digital computer product created from a combi-
nation of software and more than one form of content, used inter-
actively and in a nonlinear fashion." Its critical traits are a multi-
plicity of content forms; digital storage and delivery; computer
technology; and a nonlinear, interactive style of use." This defini-
tion reflects the changing nature of the industry and recognizes
that marketed multimedia products may look very different as
technology becomes increasingly sophisticated.
Content creators" include two and three-dimensional artists,
musicians, filmmakers, photographers, writers, performers, and
designers. 3 They may originate works specifically intended as
multimedia content, or they may create works without contemplat-
ing any use outside the original media."
6. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1186 (3d ed.
1992).
7. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 41-42 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
8. Id.
9. Andy Johnson-Laird, Multimedia and the Law, in MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW 7,
10 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. G-383,1994) [hereinafter MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW].
10. 1 THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, MULTIMEDIA LEGAL HANDBOOK: A GUIDE
FROM THE SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION § 1.2 (1996).
11. Id
12. This Comment employs the term "content creators" to refer generally to artists,
musicians, writers, and all others who create the works that become multimedia content.
Because copyright vests initially in a work's creator, unless otherwise indicated, content
creators in this Comment are presumed to own the rights to their works. Content crea-
tors will be collectively referred to as "he."
13. RAYSMAN, supra note 5, § 1.02[1].
14. See Jeffrey A. O'Connell, Selling to the Industry, in CALIFORNIA LAWYERS FOR
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Unlike the quilt maker who creates anew from the tag ends of
daily life, the multimedia producer must stitch together pieces of
jealously guarded and highly protected intellectual property. 5 To
create a new whole, one must be able to buy the right to use the
pieces. Sometimes the producer will encounter the right patch for
free in the public domain, but she" cannot rely on finding just the
right texture in such a random manner. Usually she will have to
search for it and purchase it. If the content sought is something
unique, she may need to pay handsomely, negotiating a special
deal or royalty. Otherwise, the prudent producer will try to strike
a bargain, reminding the seller that "[y]ou can never give more
than 100% in royalty."'7
In an industry where the impact of technological capability
and capacity is still uncertain, the value of individual components
of a single product is monstrously difficult to ascertain.'" The un-
certain ground producers and creators tread makes negotiating the
right to use an image, a song, or some other piece of content more
difficult. 9 When the product's content consists of hundreds or
even thousands of separate items of intellectual property, the tasks
and costs associated with negotiating and administering individual
licenses can be overwhelming and even paralyzing.? The liability,
however, of using creative content without obtaining all the proper
clearances is enormous: the producer of an infringing product is
THE ARTS, MULTIMEDIA LAW FOR ARTISTS MCLE SEMINAR HANDBOOK 1, 2 (1994)
[hereinafter MULTIMEDIA LAW FOR ARTISTS].
15. It would be almost impossible to create an encyclopedia, dictionary, or history
CD-ROM product without including samples of the subjects. How, for example, would
one discuss Beethoven without playing his music or Shakespeare without quoting a few
lines? In each of these cases, it is easy to quote because the works are in the public do-
main. But what if the subject was rock and roll or biochemical discoveries? Neither the
Rolling Stones nor the Mayo Clinic will turn a blind eye to the use of their property with-
out their permission. See Mark Litwak, Potholes on the Information Superhighway: A
Roadmap to Legal Issues in Multimedia Productions, in ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING
AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 199 (Robert Thorne & John David Viera eds., 1995-1996
ed.) [hereinafter EPAH].
16. The author will refer to multimedia producers and developers as "she." Techni-
cally, multimedia producers and developers hold different positions within the multimedia
industry. Practially, these positions may be held by the same person in an entrepreneurial
organization, and the responsibilities vary from position to position. For purposes of this
Comment, producer and developer are used loosely to indicate the person with decision-
making authority about product content.
17. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 11.
18. Id at 1.
19. Id.
20. Id at 11.
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liable for the rights holder's actual or statutory damages, the value
of the infringing producer's profits,2' and attorneys' fees and costs.'
An infringing producer is also subject to injunctive relief impound-
ing and destroying the infringing product' and requiring recall of
all units previously sold. ' In some instances, the infringing pro-
ducer would also be subject to criminal sanctions.'
These onerous licensing burdens and liabilities have led some
multimedia producers to conclude that they must generate com-
pletely original content for their products, even when they prefer
preexisting content.' This impasse fails to serve the producer, the
artist or author who desires to profit from his creations, or the con-
sumer stuck with a Hobson's Choice' of inferior content or im-
permissibly high prices.
This impasse is unnecessary. The problems of negotiating and
administering licenses for multimedia works are not insurmount-
able. This Comment focuses on formulating a practical method of
protecting the multiple types of works that constitute "content" for
multimedia products while fostering the growth of the multimedia
industry. Mechanisms for standard licensing and centralized ad-
ministration will serve multimedia creators, producers, and con-
sumers by promoting more efficient multimedia markets. Creators
will gain profit from their works. Producers will benefit because
they will not feel compelled to create new content for every new
product.' Consumers will enjoy increased availability of higher
21. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1994).
22. Id § 505.
23. Id § 503.
24. Clearing House, Ltd., A Guide to Clearing Music in Audio/Visual Multimedia
Products, in MULTIMEDIA LAW FOR ARTISTS, supra note 14, at 2 [hereinafter Clearing
House]; see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
26. "Some feel that acquiring intellectual property is so costly and problematic that
multimedia developers should produce everything themselves." MICHAEL D. SCOTT,
MULTIMEDIA LAW & PRACTICE, § 1.02 (1995) (quoting Kahin, The IMA Intellectual
Property Project, in INTERACTIVE MULTIMEDIA NEWS, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 4). This,
however, leaves the problems associated with clearing the rights to works made for hire
unsolved.
27. "Hobson's Choice" refers to an apparent choice that actually offers no real alter-
natives. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 859 (3d
ed. 1992).
28. Telephone Interview with Scott Neilson, Graphic Artist and Instructor of Digital
Image Editing & Visual Communication, The Art Institute of Seattle (Jan. 14, 1996) (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Neilson Interview]. However,
a growing number of producers resist the concept that they should pay anything to incor-
porate protected material. Id.
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quality, lower cost products.
A. Historical Background
Conflict over the use of creative works is nothing new. An
early Irish king settled the property rights in a manuscript in favor
of its author declaring, "'[t]o every cow her calf."t ' 9 Although
common law recognized authors' rights in unpublished manu-
scripts, Britain first recognized authors' rights in published works
in 1710. That year Britain passed the Statute of Anne-an "Act
for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of
Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies Dur-
ing the Times Therein Mentioned."'
In 1851 the Societe des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de
Musique (SACEM), formed in France to provide caf6 owners and
musical composers a solution to the caf6 owners' unauthorized use
of the composers' works.31 Caf6 owners needed to provide music
to attract patrons so they hired orchestras. The copyright law that
required the caf6 owners to pay the composers for playing the
music had not been enforced until 1847.2 Unfortunately, there
was neither any way for the composers to contact all the caf6 own-
ers, nor for the caf6 owners to reach each composer to secure
permission to use the music.33 SACEM stepped into the situation
to facilitate licensing, administer music public performance li-
29. ARTHUR B. HANSON & CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OMNIBUS
COPYRIGHT REVISION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 6 (1973). This event
probably occurred between the fifth century A.D., when writing was introduced to Ire-
land, and A.D. 1250 because by 1250 three-quarters of Ireland was under Norman con-
trol. JOHN O'BEIRNE RANELAGH, A SHORT HISTORY OF IRELAND 14,38 (1983).
30. HANSON & CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 29, at 5-6.
31. DAVID SINACORE-GUINN, COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHTS
AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, PROCEDURES, AND
ORGANIZATIONS § 1.0.1 (1993).
32. Id.
33. This situation still exists and is complicated by the practice of dividing and assign-
ing copyrights, as evidenced by the continued flourishing of collective administration
associations. David Sinacore-Guinn provides an extensive list of collective administration
associations. Id at xlviii-lxiii.; see also STEPHEN M. STEWART & HAMISH SANDISON,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS, 968-85 (1989) (providing a
similar list). For example, in the United States, there are three major societies and one
agency that handle music public performance rights alone. The American Society of
Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP) was founded in 1914, followed by Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI), SESAC, Inc., and the Harry Fox Agency. SINACORE-GUINN, supra
note 31, at xlviii-lxiii. In addition, the Harry Fox Agency, the American Mechanical
Rights Agency, Inc. (AMRA), and SESAC administer music synchronization and mech-
anical rights for owners and buyers. Id; STEWART & SANDISON, supra note 33, at 978.
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censes, and distribute royalty payments. SACEM became a bea-
con for all parties; there was no longer any need for them to find
each other when each party could find SACEM. Further,
SACEM's collective administration' removed the caf6 owners'
burden of administering the license fees for the many compositions
performed each night while providing composers an income from
their work. 5
SACEM satisfied the very concerns multimedia content crea-
tors and producers face today. Like the French caf6 owners, pro-
ducers have no way of reaching and negotiating with individual
creators, and the administrative burden of managing each license
might preclude producers' ability to generate multimedia prod-
ucts."
Producers want to use existing works to create a new com-
mercial product. Administering licenses and copyrights distracts
from the work of producing new multimedia creations. Producers
and developers need the freedom to focus on design and market-
ing. Consequently, they need a solution to the administrative
headache. Conversely, creators and other content owners need as-
surance they will be compensated properly for the use of their
work.
This Comment examines the multimedia licensing process, the
administration of licenses, and the balance between creators' and
producers' interests. It recommends a blanket licensing and col-
lective administration scheme to enable creators and producers to
work together for their mutual benefit.
Part II of this Comment briefly introduces the multimedia in-
dustry and looks at the challenges raised by its intense use of con-
tent, its plasticity, and its digital character. Part II also examines
how the fragmented and international character of intellectual
property ownership confuses and complicates rights issues. Part
III addresses how mass use affects intellectual property rights and
analyzes whether multimedia should be considered a mass use. It
then discusses the vast differences in resources and bargaining
power between various types of producers and creators within the
34. Collective administration is discussed infra Part IV.
35. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 1.0.
36. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 11; see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1979) (discussing the impossibility of licensing music public performance rights on an
individual basis). Music is only one component of multimedia so the problem the Court
discusses is compounded with respect to multimedia.
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structure of the multimedia content marketplace. Part IV looks at
the various types of collective administration from the perspective
of antitrust concerns and multimedia logistics. Part V distin-
guishes between blanket and compulsory licenses, presents the is-
sues surrounding each type, and then discusses licensing in a mul-
timedia context. Part VI proposes a multimedia licensing scheme
aimed at building a mutually beneficial commerce between crea-
tors and producers. The proposed scheme will both surmount the
hurdles involved in clearing the rights to use content and reduce
the cost of licensing by simplifying the negotiation process.
II. BACKGROUND OF MULTIMEDIA AND ITS RIGHTS ISSUES
Multimedia presently includes interactive television, virtual
reality, and disk-based products; it is certain to include other tech-
nologies as these mature. Interactive television is in its infancy
and has largely awaited the standardization of the high definition
television (HDTV)Y HDTV will be a boon to the entire multi-
media industry because its high-definition display, suitable for
both computer and television viewing, will support multimedia's
graphic demands. 8 This product should soon be available in a
standardized form,39 but will be very expensive until the general
public accepts it as a desirable standard.'
37. Richard E. Wiley, Good Fortune With Great Pictures: HDTV Technology Can
Foster Multimedia Applications, in MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 25, 33.
38. Id
39. Id.
40. The life-cycle of a technological product market can be illustrated by the con-
sumer market for audio compact disks (CDs). SCOTT, supra note 26, § 1.01[B][4] & chart
1.1. The "early adopters" purchased the first CD players at outrageous prices while few
titles were available. Id. Early adopters represent a tiny percentage of the market char-
acterized by high income, a fascination or obsession with technology, and a willingness to
pay any price. Id. "Early majority" consumers build the market. Unlike early adopters,
the early majority purchase when it is a reasonable gamble that the technology is here to
stay, following the first significant price break. Id. Of reasonably high disposable income,
these people still form a small percentage of the market. The "majority" buy once the
price has dropped into a reasonable range and the benefits of the technology are appar-
ent. Id. This is when the technology becomes a household word. The "late majority,"
afraid that the new technology will go the way of the eight-track tape, are of middle to
lower income, are not technologically focused, and wait until there are major sales on the
technology. Id. The "late adopters" are stragglers, usually with minimal disposable in-
come or little interest. Id. By the time late adopters purchase, the early adopters have
moved on to the next breakthrough. Id. Until the early majority adopts HDTV, it will
not be a significant force in the multimedia industry because market forces dictate that
most products will be designed to sell for the technology in use by the majority of con-
sumers. See id.
November 1996]
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Virtual reality (VR) is also in its infancy, but is growing in
both research and entertainment applications. VR is a computer
generated, simulated, multisensory environment in three dimen-sions." Am immersed VR user perceives the environment as
"reality" and interacts with it from a first-person point of view.42
To achieve this result the user usually dons special gloves, head-
gear, or sometimes a whole suit, connected to sensors and a com-
puter.4' Until recently, apart from a few research laboratories, this
technology was hardly "real.' It was easy to distinguish between
reality and virtual reality. 5 Now, however, technology has ad-
vanced to such a point that there are virtual reality arcades in
which patrons immerse themselves in virtual worlds where they
play truly interactive multimedia games." The "feelies" of Aldous
Huxley's Brave New World"7 have not yet appeared, and virtual
reality has yet to enter the average home. Technological advances,
however, may soon allow VR to come knocking at our doors,
48
bringing with it not only excitement but a plethora of moral and
legal questions our society has yet to address.49
41. SCoTT, supra note 26, § 1.03[D].
42. Id.
43. Gregory MacNicol, What's Wrong With Reality? A Realist Reflects on Virtual
Reality: Is It a Virtual Boon Or a Boondoggle?, COMPUTER GRAPHICS WORLD, Nov.
1990, at 102,104.
44. Id. The Human Interface Technology Laboratory (HITL) at the University of
Washington, NASA, and JPL Research have developed much of the current virtual real-
ity technology including the "Cyberspace" system, the DataGlove, and the "DataSuit."
ld. at 104. HITL's objective is to "develop natural interface techniques designed for
experimental rather than symbolic interaction." Id.
45. Id In 1990 the available technology could not yet render images at 30 frames per
second, which gave the images a "jumpy, staccato-like quality." Id. at 108.
46. Id. at 102.
47. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946). (The feelies were supposed to
be so "real" that one could feel every hair of a bearskin rug.) See id. at 39.
48. Grogan, supra note 4, at 257,318-27.
49. Unfortunately, the scope of this discussion precludes delving into such fascinating
questions as the elements of and remedies for torts caused by or in virtual worlds, who
holds the intellectual property rights to the realization created by a user interacting with a
virtual world, or the moral and ethical questions surrounding virtual reality's effect on
blurring the distinction between reality and imagination. "[T]here is every reason to sus-
pect that our ability, as well as our desire, to discriminate between reality and its various
representations may be in a permanent state of atrophy." Robin Nelson, Swept Away by
the Digital Age, POPULAR SCIENCE, Nov. 1993, at 92, 96. Huxley's Brave New World is
an introductory exploration demonstrating the profound ramifications of a societal inabil-
ity to discriminate between reality and virtual reality. Nor is the idea of societal seduc-
tion by virtual reality unthinkable. "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistin-
guishable from magic" and magic, whether ancient illusions or psychic hotlines, has
[Vol. 30:215
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Disk based products are, by far, the most common multimedia
products.' These come in two basic platforms, "set-top boxes"
and "desktop systems."'" Set-top boxes sit on top of, and interact
with, a television set.52 They are used primarily for video games
and are further divided into stand-alone players and video game
add-on hardware.53 These formats are incompatible with each
other and with desktop systems.'
Desktop systems are generally personal computer based CD-
ROM systems, primarily used for game technology, educational,
and business applications.55 The market for desktop systems is
growing and diversifying.56 The compact disk (CD) is an inexpen-
sive, convenient way to store and access tremendous quantities of
information. A standard audio CD holds up to seventy-four min-
utes of digital audio information.' A standard CD-ROM holds up
to 650 megabytes of data, more than many hard drives and
equivalent to 464 high-density floppy disks. 8 Technological im-
provements have led to another kind of disk, which will arrive in
retail stores by late 1996."9 DVD, or Digital Video Disk, is a dual-
sided, dual-layer CD that can store up to 18 gigabytes, about the
equivalent of 12,500 high-density floppy disks, in a disk the same
size as a standard CD. It is currently intended to replace VCR
technology.' As the only disk with the speed and capacity to store
whole movies, DVD may also prove to be the technological jump
that disk based multimedia needs to fully realize its potential. If
multimedia producers create projects using preexisting content for
DVD, DVD's capacity will also exacerbate the current intellectual
property problems associated with multimedia.
always had a drug-like seductivity. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, THE LOST WORDS OF 2001 179
(1972).
50. See SCOTT, supra note 26, § 1.01[A].
51. Id. § 1.01 [B][31.
52. Id. §§ 1.01[B][3], 1.03[A].
53. Id. §§ 1.01[B][3], 1.03[A][4]-[5].
54. Id. § 1.03[AI.
55. Id. § 1.02[A][1]-[3].
56. Id. § 1.02[A][3]. In 1995 CD-ROM software for business eclipsed game software
for the first time. Silverthorne, supra note 2, at A12. However, this jump in the second
quarter may have been a temporary shift due to the phenomenally successful introduction
of Windows95, which was introduced on CD-ROM as well as traditional floppy disks. Id.
57. Erik Holsinger, Multimedia 101, COMPUTER CURRENTS, May 1996, at 26,33.
58. d. at 33-34.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id.
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A. Plastic Program Problems
The most common multimedia product is a CD-ROM product
based on a "story" that branches at several levels and has multiple
endings. Each ending depends on the users' choices made earlier
in the program. 6' Seen schematically, this type of program resem-
bles a very complex flowchart and is known as a branching pro-
gram.6' Branching programs offer users the opportunity to mold
and remold their experience, giving the program a "plastic" qual-
ity.3 The plasticity of a branching program creates intellectual
property problems.
All multimedia programs, including branching programs, have
two basic components, code and content. ' Code is what makes the
program run. It encompasses both the user interface and the plat-
form on which the interface runs.65 The law treats code differently
than content, 6 and few of the issues addressed here remain unre-
solved for code.
Content is the heart of the story; it is what sells the product.67
Content is what the user perceives-the story, the rich visual im-
agery, the sounds, the music.' It can include video, audio, photo-
graphs, text, graphics, animation, art, architecture, and perform-
ances. These elements, captured and stored digitally within the
program, and used together, become the content. 9
The volume and plasticity of the content create three prob-
lems. There is the logistical issue of clearing and tracking the
61. See William A. Tanenbaum, Current Multimedia Patent, Copyright, Work Made
for Hire, and Rights Acquisition Issues, in MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at
97.
62. lit at 101-05 (discussing Compton's New Media Patent #5,241,671 entitled
"Multimedia Search System Using a Plurality of Entry Path Means which Indicate Inter-
relatedness of Information" and reprinting the schematic included in the patent).
63. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2.08[D ] n.145 (1996).
64. SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 10, § 1.2[A]; Litwak, supra note 15, at 218-20.
65. RAYSMAN, supra note 5, § 1.02; SCOr, supra note 26, § 1.01; see Litwak, supra
note 15, at 200.
66. Because it is clearly software, code is subject to the highly sophisticated and de-
fined business world of computer software and hardware. In most jurisdictions software
development contracts are governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See,
e.g., RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985); Advent Systems
Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 673-76 (3d Cir. 1991).
67. RAYSMAN, supra note 5, § 1.02[1.
68. Id
69. See id.; SCOTT, supra note 26, § 1.01.
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fights to use each piece.'0 Then, even if all the content owners
agree to license the works for the product, the branching structure
of multimedia creates a difficulty in determining the value of each
piece. Finally, the medium's digital nature creates enforcement
problems because users may change digital content in ways that
make it difficult or impossible to recognize.7
1. Volume problems
A regular, linear story that takes two hours to tell contains
two hours of content. A branching story with several possible
endings, however, contains many times that amount of content.
72
For example, suppose an author wishes to produce an illustrated
book about Irish Castles. He may know he needs text and "151
illustrations, 15 in colour, plans and a map"' for a book of about
200 pages. The multimedia publisher will replace much of the text
with images and consequently will require many more images.'
She may need to digitally reconstruct those castles now in ruins.
She will need interiors, exteriors, and floor plans of every castle to
create the sense that the user is walking through the halls and
rooms. She will need to give every castle the attention that the
book's author need only give to a few representational sites. This
is because the user may prefer to see the inside of Limerick or Ro-
scommon castles instead of Dublin Castle, although all three are
representative of the royal keepless castle.' In addition, consumer
expectations are different for multimedia products than for books.
The producer, therefore, will almost certainly need to incorporate
music, additional color images and video of the site, as well as of
arts and crafts such as textiles, furniture, paintings, and sculpture. 6
The producer adds these elements so that users believe they can
realistically explore the rooms and grounds of various castles.
70. ScOTr, supra note 26, § 1.01. Most content is subject to copyright protection and
usually each piece must be cleared individually. See Litwak, supra note 15, at 200-01.
71. For an example of how images change through the morphing process see
Holsinger, supra note 57, at 35, illus.27.
72. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 9, at 17.
73. BRIAN DE BREFFNY, CASTLES OF IRELAND, title page (Thames & Hudson 1992)
(1977). Although the architecture of the castles would be in the public domain, their de-
pictions in photos or drawings, as well as their reconstructions, may be protected, even if
created for this specific project. If so, these images will need to be cleared.
74. SCOTr, supra note 26, § 1.02[c](1).
75. DE BREFFNY, supra note 73, at 14-15.
76. See SCOTT, supra note 26, §§ 4.01,5.01,6.01.
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The multimedia producer, therefore, needs many times the
content the book's author needs, as well as many different kinds of
content, each with its own set of property rights. Further, the pro-
ducer will often need more than one kind of right. For example,
what if the proposed content includes a piece of traditional Irish
music in the program, and the developer wants to use the Chief-
tains' song "Boil the Breakfast Early"?' The developer will need
a master license in the composition as well as a license in the ren-
dition. 8 She must clear the right to the composition with CBS Re-
cords and the rights to the album rendition with Claddagh Rec-
ords, Ltd. 9 This project will require at least two licenses, one to
synchronize the recording to the action in the program and a mas-
ter license to record and distribute the song in the product ' and, if
necessary, to convert the song to a digital format."' The project
will also require a public performance license through the band's
performing rights society if the product is to be publicly demon-
strated, for example, in a trade show." The Chieftains may also
have trademarked their name or even the name of the song.
Trademark adds another layer of requirements and licenses to the
use." If the producer prominently displays or advertises the band's
name, especially if she uses a photo of the band, she may also have
to address rights of publicity and privacy.' Finally, if the producer
borrowed ideas or reconstructions with commercial value and used
them in a way that impairs the commercial value to the original
creator, the producer may confront unfair competition rules.'
77. THE CHIEFrAINS, Boil the Breakfast Early, on BOIL THE BREAKFAST EARLY (©
CBS Records 1980, (p) Claddagh Records, Ltd. 1979).
78. See discussion infra Part V.A.
79. THE CHIEFTAINS, Boil the Breakfast Early, on BOIL THE BREAKFAST EARLY (0
CBS Records 1980, (p) Claddagh Records, Ltd. 1979). The copyrights in the composition
and the rendition are displayed on the album cover.
80. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106, 114 (West & Supp. 1996) (scope of exclusive rights).
81. Id. § 101 (West & Supp. 1996) (sound recordings do "not includ[e] the sounds ac-
companying a motion picture or other audiovisual work"); id § 106(1) (granting exclusive
right of reproduction in copies or phonorecords).
82. Id. § 106(4). For a general discussion of public performance rights societies, see
William M. Dobishinki, ASCAP/BMI Primer, in THE MUSICIAN'S BUSINESS AND LEGAL
GUIDE 176 (Mark Halloran ed., 1991).
83. SCOTr, supra note 26, § 11.01.
84. Id. §§ 11.01, 14.01, 15.01; Jordan Stringfellow and Helene Godin, Setting the
Stage: Guidelines for Television Prop Clearances, ENT. L. REP., Mar. 1994, at 3, 3.




In the castle book, the author will probably license preexisting
photos through a clearinghouse.86 Clearinghouses set license fees
based on their assumptions about the use, sales, and exposure of
the images in a bookY
The multimedia producer will quickly discover problems with
this scheme. First, it is difficult to set assumptions about use when
one has no way to know what the user will view while progressing
through a branching program. It is even harder to determine how
many times the user will see each item. If the licensor bases value
on the anticipated number of impressions an image is to have, un-
certainty hampers the calculation of its license price.'
Ostensibly, in this case, a tapestry typical of the thirteenth
century, which is used to illustrate the royal keepless castle, could
be viewed in conjunction with each castle. If its license is based on
anticipated impressions and the licensor calculates one impression
for each castle, its license fee for the tapestry image could be
higher than the fee for individual images of the castles it is meant
to ornament. This result seems inverted. A stock photo, used in a
secondary capacity, should not cost more than the primary subject
merely because the user may view it more than once. Further,
there is no way in which the licensor can determine how many
castles the user will explore, and hence, how many impressions the
tapestry will make. Further, if after looking through Dublin in de-
tail, and seeing only the exterior ruins of Roscommon, the user
moves on to another type of castle, never viewing Limerick at all,
do Roscommon, Dublin, and Limerick have the same value?
The second valuation problem is how the value of photo-
graphs in a multimedia presentation compares to the value of the
same photographs in the book. Assume license fees were set at
$100 per image."- The images for this book would cost $15,100 to
license.' If the multimedia producer wants to sell her product at
standard retail prices, the images must be priced far below $100
each because of the vastly greater number of images that must be
86. See O'Connell, supra note 14, at 3-4.
87. Id
88. Id at 3-4.
89. This price may be conservative. Images frequently are licensed for hundreds and
even thousands of dollars. Neilson Interview, supra note 28.
90. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
November 19961
228 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW
included." Yet the artist may well ask, "Why should I license my
photo to you for less than I would charge you to print it in a
book?"92
Each of these aspects fits into the determination of value, and
each is a reason many content owners are waiting on the sidelines
until a standard price emerges.' The owners' hesitation combined
with an incipient attitude in the industry that it is acceptable to use
copyright protected material without permission or payment94
means many deals never close. Failure to close licensing deals cre-
ates consequential losses to both content owners and multimedia
producers that far surpass the mere loss of income.' Not only do
91. SCOTt, supra note 26, § 1.02[c](1) "No matter how successful the CD-ROM is, it
will not be successful enough to justify paying $100 per photograph." Id.; Litwak, supra
note 15, at 200. "The amount of money a producer can afford to pay and still recoup on
[her] investment is relatively small at this time because of the limited market for the end-
product." Id. While there may be wide variation in the retail sale price and volume for
multimedia products, they will be profitable only when their costs of production are low in
comparison to their market prices. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
ECONOMICS 60-61 (13th ed. 1989); see also Michelle Matassa Flores, Corbis Corp adds
Ansel Adams to Collection, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al (Corbis Corp. planning
to market a CD-ROM of Ansel Adams' work for about $50); Richard Raysman & Peter
Brown, Multimedia Licensing, N.Y.LJ., July 13, 1993, at 3 (reporting that Microsoft paid
about $500,000, or ten percent of its total project budget, for the licenses necessary to its
Encarta Multimedia Encyclopedia).
92. See Neilson Interview, supra note 28.
93. Litwak, supra note 15, at 200. "Content owners do not know what to charge to
license material for multimedia use. CBS Inc. is reportedly charging fifteen dollars a sec-
ond for material in its library." Id
94. James Martin discusses an ad for the "Rip-Off Artist," a hand-held scanner with
which the ad encourages buyers to "'lift a photo, logo or drawing and transfer it to a re-
port, manual or article' and to 'rip off graphics (and now text) risk-free."' James A. Mar-
tin, Are You Breaking the Law? A Guide to Image Copyright Do's and Don'ts,
MACWORLD, May 1994, at 124, 127 (emphasis added). The ad suggests appropriating
text by scanning "books, encyclopedias and newspapers." Id. Although it does contain
two copyright warnings, it is hard to see anything but a brazen inducement to copyright
infringement. See also Source Licensing: Hearing on S.1980 Before the Subcomm. on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 255-56 (1986) (statement of Hal David, Pres. of ASCAP) [hereinafter Source Li-
censing] (urging Congress to eliminate the blanket license for television programming);
Scott Collins, Uneasy Writers: ASCAP Chief, Songwriters Fight Plan to Cut Royalties, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at D1 (discussing restaurant owners' lobbying effort to exempt res-
taurants from the music public performance license requirement); Mary Eisenhart, Intel-
lectual Property in a Digital World. Who Owns It? Who Controls It? Who Pays For It?,
MICROTIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at 105 (discussing copyright issues facing software developers
and multimedia content creators); Neilson Interview, supra note 28 (discussing his stu-
dents' perception that there is nothing wrong with using a continuous tone scanner to in-
corporate someone else's work into their project).
95. SCOTT, supra note 26, § 1.02.
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creators lose income, but the advent of some kind of pricing stan-
dard is postponed, and creators incrementally lose control of their
work.96
In light of the technological facts of digital imaging and stor-
age, and the emergence of more new products than any creator
could possibly police for infringement, creators' failure to license
willing developers jeopardizes the very right they seek to protect-
the exclusive right to exploit their work for a limited timeY But
creators are not alone. The identical factors threatening their
work also threaten developers whose completed compilations are
themselves subject to copyright and other protections as derivative
works.' Further, developers tempted to use works without per-
mission face the Copyright Act of 1976," which explicitly voids the
copyright in any portion of a derivative work "in which such ma-
terial is used unlawfully.""
Meanwhile, a new breed of artists is emerging who intend to
produce content specifically for multimedia.'1 While these artists
may devise standards for pricing new works created for specific
products, the market for preexisting works will not necessarily
standardize on the same basis. There are a number of differences.
For example, a new work's creation must be compensated, while
the creation of existing work has presumably already been com-
pensated."° The fee structure to license preexisting works is also
necessarily different than it is for content created pursuant to a
work-for-hire agreement. 3 or for a rights assignment. Although
96. See infra, Parts II.A.3, III.A-C.
97. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 201.
98. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (defining, among other things, derivative works and audiovis-
ual works). Multimedia can be defined as an audio-visual work and thus is regulated un-
der § 101.
99. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-104, 105-106, 107-115, 117-118,
201-510, 601-803.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a); see 1 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 3.06.
101. For example, InterOctave and Broderbund are companies founded for the pur-
pose of providing professional quality multimedia content, including soundtracks with
Hollywood production values. See Bob Safir, Reverberation: Sounding Off, MORPH'S
OUTPOST ON THE DIGITAL FRONTIER (InterOctave, San Jose, Cal.), July 1994, at 34 (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.)
102. This presumption will sometimes fail, but it is based on the idea that the multi-
media producer saw or heard the work somewhere. Exposure indicates a previous publi-
cation, display, or performance that probably was compensated.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); see discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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the preexisting work would have been created without compensa-
tion for multimedia use, the rights licensed to a multimedia pro-
ducer by owners of preexisting content will probably differ from
those granted by employees, independent contractors, or specially
commissioned artists i"4 Licensing preexisting works, therefore, not
creating new works, will produce the standards for preexisting con-
tent.
3. The downstream use problem
Multimedia's digital character accentuates a third hurdle.
Creators seek to protect their work and are often leery of licensing
it in ways that remove it from their control.05 Because multimedia
is based on digital capture and storage, creators are concerned
about what will happen to their works after they appear in a mul-
timedia product. This is known as the "downstream use prob-
lem.""I
The digital process converts an image or sound to binary code
and stores it as information." Once a work of art is in digital
form, one can duplicate it, compress it for storage, combine it with
other information, and manipulate it in ways never envisioned by
the work's creator, all without depreciating its original quality.'
This means any work that can be captured, whether an original or
a copy, can be digitized and stored as an original image.' 9 It can
then be sampled, cloned onto another image, or "morphed" with
another image."' The original works may not be recognizable, but
they are an inseparable part of both the intermediary and com-
104. Copyrights in works for hire are owned by the employer, not the employee-
creator, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), and in this case no rights are granted because the producer
already owns them. Copyright assignments and exclusive licenses grant, to a slightly
lesser degree, the full rights to the producer. The rights holder of preexisting content,
however, may have already granted, sold, or licensed significant portions of his rights to
other parties, so what is being licensed is not the same in the two cases. See infra Part
II.B.2.
105. Litwak, supra note 15, at 201-02.
106. ScoTr, supra note 26, § 1.02[C](5).
107. Teresa Riordan, Writing Copyright Law for an Information Age, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 1994, at C1, C5.
108. Id. at Cl; SCOTT, supra note 26, § 1.01[A](4).
109. Litwak, supra note 15, at 202.
110. Morphing creates a series of intermediate images all of which contain elements of
the original images. Holsinger, supra note 57, at 35, illus.27; see Judith Merians, An
Overview of New Technology and the Entertainment Industry, reprinted in EPAH, supra
note 15, at 245.
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pleted images.' In addition, currently available scanner technol-
ogy includes descreening software that strips the half-tone screen-
ing from a printed image, calculates the original colors from the
screening, and restores the image to continuous tone."' This en-
ables an unlicensed user to scan a printed image, converting it in
the process to a continuous tone image ready for clean digitizing
and manipulation."'
Copyright owners concerned about digital infringement can-
not afford to hide in the illusion that their refusal to license the
work will protect it. If their work is marketable people will use it,
and infringement will be difficult both to discover and to prove."4
This leaves two basic questions: will the artist have any control
over the inevitable use of his work, and will the artist be paid for
that use? The practical likelihood of payment increases with the
producer's access to easily and affordably licensed material.
B. Clearing the Content
Clearing the rights to content is the most critical intellectual
property issue a multimedia producer faces."5 It is the process of
getting permission to use a work and must be addressed for both
new and preexisting content. Using protected works without
permission is infringement."' An infringement suit can result in
judgments far exceeding the product's value,"7 and damages may
include attorneys' fees and costs."8 In addition, the rights owner
may ask for injunctive relief, including seizure of unsold product
and recall of all units sold. 9
An example may help to illustrate this point. Delrina, a soft-
ware company, created a computer screen saver that featured the
cartoon penguin Opus shooting down flying toasters." Another
111. Litwak, supra note 15, at 202; Holsinger, supra note 57, at 35, illus.27; Neilson In-
terview, supra note 28.
112. Neilson Interview, supra note 28.
113. Id.
114. See Merians, supra note 110, at 245.
115. See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 3, at 10-14.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). (1994).
117. Id. § 504 (actual damages plus infringer's profits); id. § 506 (criminal sanctions);
id. § 509 (seizure and forfeiture, including "all electronic, mechanical, or other devices for
manufacturing, reproducing, or assembling such copies").
118. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
119. Id §§ 502,503,509.
120. J. Dianne Brinson & Mark F. Radcliffe, Intellectual Property Law Primer for
Multimedia Developers, COMMUNITY CJ., Oct.-Nov. 1995, at 20,20.
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software company, Berkeley Systems, had already made the flying
toasters famous in their own screen saver.12 ' Berkeley sued Del-
rina for copyright and trademark infringement." Delrina was
prohibited from further distributing their product and had to recall
all unsold units." Delrina lost hundreds of thousands of dollars in
legal fees and damages.
A subsequent case, The Jefferson Airplane v. Berkeley Sys-
tems, Inc., 2 discussed Delrina. Here, the Jefferson Airplane
claimed that the Berkeley Systems' flying toasters screen saver was
itself an infringement of the Jefferson Airplane's copyright in the
cover art for the album Thirty Seconds Over Winterland 6 The al-
bum cover featured an illustration of two winged toasters flying in
formation, much like the flying toasters module." Unfortunately
for the Jefferson Airplane, the copyright on their album cover was
never properly registered and the court lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction.'" Had the Jefferson Airplane been able to complete the
suit and win, Berkeley Systems would have been liable not only to
the Jefferson Airplane, but also to Delrina because Delrina could
not have infringed Berkeley Systems' module if it was not pro-
tected by copyright.129 Of course, Delrina would still have had to
address infringement issues with the Jefferson Airplane.
Copyright protects most content.'" Copyright, however, is not
a deed or some piece of paper that bestows universal, immutable





125. 886 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
126. Id
127. Id. at 714.
128. Id. at 717; see 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
129. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201,204.
130. Copyright in the United States protects "original works of authorship" that are
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression." Id. § 102. Pursuant to the Berne Conven-
tion, the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4976 [hereinafter GATT], and other intellectual
property treaties and reciprocal proclamations, works protected in one country are like-
wise protected in other signatory countries. However, beyond certain minimum levels,
the protection is generally subject to national treatment, that is, subject to the laws of the
country in which enforcement of rights is sought. This coverage may differ significantly
from the coverage in the country of origin, especially in terms of duration of copyright.




work conveys its copyright.13' Copyright is an ownership interest
that vests initially in those creators or authors of a work who con-
tribute "copyrightable expression" to the work. 32 It may be a joint
interest.' It also may be divided, transferred, licensed, granted, or
assigned like any other piece of property."M In clearing the rights
the user must be certain to clear all the necessary rights. For ex-
ample, a song in a popular recording will have two or three sepa-
rate copyrights: the first in the composition, the second in the re-
cording of that composition, and the third in the specific rendition
that was recorded.35 Several individuals may jointly hold each of
these rights.'36 For example, a single person, a combination of in-
dividuals and companies, or an entire band may share one or more
copyrights in a song. The parties may divide the ownership inter-
ests unevenly, in which case the rights will have to be cleared with
at least a majority of the owners, or with owners representing a
majority of the ownership interests."
1. New works
Clearing the rights to new works is much simpler than clearing
the rights to preexisting works because the affected parties can
define the rights before they become fractionalized and confused.
A multimedia producer, who is not also the content creator, must
first determine whether the new creation is a work made for hire.'38
If it is a work for hire, then the multimedia producer's troubles are
over; she owns the work with all its rights and may exploit the
work freely.'39 If the new creation is not a work made for hire, the
producer must clear the work just as she would any preexisting
content. The principal difference is that, because the work is re-
cent, all the interested parties are easier to find.
2. Works made for hire
Works created by the multimedia producer's employees in the
131. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101; 17 U.S.C. § 202.
132. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102,201.
133. Id. § 201.
134. Id. § 201(d).
135. Id. § 102; 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101,106.
136. 17 U.S.C. § 201.
137. Id. § 201(d).
138. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101; 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (governing works made for hire); Id
§205(e) ("nonexclusive license.., prevails over a conflicting transfer").
139. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
November 1996]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
scope of their employment are works made for hire."4 The Code
provides a long list of factors for determining whether the creator
is an employee. These factors include: the duration of the rela-
tionship, who provides the tools and instrumentalities for the
work, where the work is done, the degree of autonomy the em-
ployee has in determining work hours, the scope of employment,
whether the employee has discretion to hire and pay assistants,
whether payment depends on completion of the job, and who pays
the taxes and benefits. 4' Courts focus on who is in control. 42 If, on
balance, the producer is in control, then the creator is an em-
ployee, but if the creator is in control, then the creator is an inde-
pendent contractor.'43 Independent contractors very rarely qualify
as employees and, with one narrow exception,'" copyright vests in
an independent contractor who cannot be defined as an em-
ployee. 5 The exception was carved out for certain types of spe-
cially commissioned works including "motion pictures or other
audio-visual works.""' "Multimedia software can be defined as an
'audio-visual work.""' 7 If, however, the independent contractor is
working on something that does not fit into this narrow exception,
the independent contractor, not the multimedia producer, owns
the copyright.
When the specially commissioned work exception applies, the
parties must follow some formalities to take advantage of the ex-
ception. Primarily, the parties must agree in writing that the result
is to be a work made for hire. 48 There has been some controversy
over when the writing must be signed to be enforced. Courts will
enforce a writing signed prior to commencement of the work; after
that point, the producer should not count on the work made for
hire exception."'
140. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
141. The definition of employee is narrowly construed. See Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-53 (1989); 1 NIMMER, supra note 63,
§ 5.03[B][2][d].
142. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
143. Id
144. See, 1 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 5.03[B][2][a].
145. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
146. Id; 1 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 5.03[B][2][a].
147. Karen S. Frank, Intellectual Property Issues in Multimedia, in MULTIMEDIA AND
THE LAW, supra note 9, at 163, 173.
148. Id at 172.
149. E.g., Reid, 490 U.S. at 734. Courts have held that the exception did not apply to
works made for hire when the agreement was signed after commencement of the work.
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When the creation does not qualify as a work made for hire,
the wise producer will get an immediate written assignment of
copyright from the work's creator.150 The importance of defining
the relationship early and getting a proper assignment cannot be
overstated. It is amply demonstrated by the dispute between Joe
Sparks and Michael Saenz. 5' The two began litigating in 1993 to
determine whether Saenz' company, Reactor, Inc. employed Mr.
Sparks or whether Sparks was an independent contractor.152 If
Sparks was an employee, he retains no legal interest in his work,
but if he was an independent contractor, he is co-owner of Space-
ship Warlock, a successful game. 53 As a co-owner, he would be
entitled to half of the profits from the game as well as an owner's
right to exploit the product. In this case his share could be worth
hundreds of thousands of dollars.154
3. Preexisting works
Intellectual property, like real property, consists of a bundle of
rights that can be parceled out stick by stick. Unlike real property,
however, which conveniently sits in one place, intellectual prop-
erty is as mobile as its creators, and mere ownership or possession
of the tangible object indicates no interest in the intellectual prop-
erty rights attached to the object.15  Once ownership of the object
and of the rights associated with that object become severed, the
rights are readily fractionalized. The severability of rights has
been recognized for over a century. In 1894, in Werckmeister v.
Springer Lithographing Co., 6 the court addressed "whether ...
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that en-
dorsements on the back of payment checks mentioning assignment but not work for hire
failed to create a work for hire agreement), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 567 (1995). Compare
Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying
bright line rule of prior agreement) with Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes,
Inc., 29 F.3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a later writing can confirm status set out
in prior oral agreement); see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 63 § 5.03[B][2][b] (discussing
writing requirement).
150. An assignment is a grant of the title and all the intellectual property rights to the
work and may be permanent. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 119 (6th ed. 1990).




155. 17 U.S.C. § 202; Werckmeister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 F. 808, 811
(S.D.N.Y. 1894) ("The case of Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. 97, [(1882)] implies through-
out that the ownership... itself does not necessarily carry with it the right to copyright.").
156. 63 F. at 810.
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the artist could sell [a] painting to one person, and the right to ob-
tain the copyright to another" and held that "[t]he intellectual
conceptions of an author are his absolute property."'" Conse-
quently, the court allowed the sale. In Werckmeister the artist sold
a painting to one party, retained the copyright, and sold an option
to purchase the copyright to a third party.158 Thus, three parties
simultaneously held an interest in the painting. This very simple
example is compounded geometrically when there is more than
one copyright owner59 or the owner begins to divide the bundle of
sticks into individual rights, parceling out each right by geography
and duration."
Most people wish to own marketable rights in order to benefit
from the control and exploitation of those rights. 6' As such, the
more pieces into which the owner can divide rights, the more
profitable the rights are to their owner. Film distribution rights,
for example, are sold to companies with the infrastructure to as-
sure market saturation in order to finance production of the film.62
Movie distribution rights may be divided by specific product, i.e.,
theatrical prints, videocassettes, cable or pay television, and net-
work television.63 Those rights can then be sold worldwide, di-
vided regionally, or even severed country by country' so that
rights to Asian videocassette distribution, for instance, can be di-
vided between Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the
rest of Asia, with a different price attached to each license."'5
157. Id.
158. l. at 809.
159. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 3, at 391.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2); see KOHN & KOHN, supra note 3, at 558-61 (discussing
temporal and geographic division of music licenses); see also White-Smith Music Publish-
ing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) ("The notion of property starts ... from con-
firmed possession of a tangible object .... But in copyright... [t]he right to exclude..
restrains the spontaneity of men where but for it there would be nothing of any kind to
hinder their doing as they saw fit.") Id. at 19. (Holmes, J., concurring).
161. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir.
1981) (later reversed, the Ninth Circuit's opinion articulated this attitude and attempted
to support it constitutionally), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
162. Lewis Horwitz, Borrowing on Distribution Contracts for the Production of a Mo-
tion Picture (1992), in LIONEL S. SOBEL, MATERIALS FOR A COURSE ON FEATURE FILM
FINANCING 517, 519, 525-26 (1995) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Li-
onel S. Sobel, Financing the Production of Theatrical Motion Pictures, 5 ENT. L. REP.,
May 1984, at 3,4-5,7 [hereinafter Sobel, Financing].
163. Sobel, Financing, supra note 162, at 5-7.




These licenses may also be temporally limited. The license to dis-
tribute in Japan may be for three years while the Taiwan distribu-
tion contract has a five-year term. Each intellectual property right
may be so subdivided or fractionalized."6 Fractionalization, like
the development of new media, creates a situation in which many
content owners do not know what rights they own, which rights
they must clear in order to license the content, or what it will cost
them to clear those rights. 7
C. The Practical Process of Clearance
To ensure the commercial viability of the product, the multi-
media producer must be certain to acquire the appropriate clear-
ances and releases for all protected content being used in the
product.'" To accomplish this, the producer must first determine
whether any rights need to be acquired and, if so, what rights they
are 6 9 and who owns them."'
Identifying the necessary rights and their ownership requires
healthy doses of diligence, skepticism, and patience. The multi-
media producer must question everything. It is unwise to assume
the license includes all the rights a developer needs. For example,
when a multimedia producer acquires a film clip license, that li-
cense will almost certainly not include the necessary licenses to any
music on the clip."' Yet the developer almost certainly intends to
use the soundtrack with the clip, and hence, the music. Thus, the
developer will need to clear the appropriate music licenses. If she
cannot acquire the rights to the music in the clip, the producer may
be unable to effectively use the clip. If she deletes and then repro-
duces the soundtrack, she risks violating the original participants'
rights of publicity and personality7 ' as well as the terms of the li-
cense to use the clip.
166. Clearing House, supra note 24, at 4-8.
167. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 10.10[B]. The question, "What rights were
granted?" is complicated by the implied grant of collateral rights, that is, those rights nec-
essary "to permit the full enjoyment of a right expressly ... granted." Id. § 10.10[CJ.
168. Litwak, supra note 15, at 200-01; Mark Traphagen, Legal Issues in Creating and
Protecting New Media, reprinted in EPAH, supra note 15, at 233, 234.
169. Traphagen, supra note 168, at 234-37.
170. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 10.13[B]; KOHN & KOHN, supra note 3, at 396-
400.
171. SCOTr, supra note 26, §§ 4.02,22.03.
172. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Litwak, supra note 15,
at 214.
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In addition, the licensee developer must not rely on the licen-
sor's representations about ownership. The license itself should
contain warranties and indemnification clauses to protect the li-
censee from third-party ownership claims.173 Moreover, the licen-
see should perform a search through the U.S. Copyright Office.'
Such a search will provide the identities of the owners of record if
the copyright was registered in the United States.17 It will not,
however, disclose foreign registrations or unregistered copy-
rights. 6 A developer should hire an attorney and use a profes-
sional search firm to unearth registrations, as a search firm may
accomplish the search more expediently and thoroughly than the
developer could.'
Preexisting content may be protected by copyright, trade-
mark, trade secret, patent, or unfair competition laws. The bulk of
content will be protected by copyright or trademark law.'78 Patent
and trade secret law will most often apply to the underlying code
or hardware.'79 Unfair competition law may apply if the producer
uses a commercially valuable item that costs money to produce but
which is not eligible for other intellectual property protection.'
For example, copyright does not protect titles.'8' If, however, titles
have secondary meaning, are "novel," or there has been mer-
chandising associated with the name, they may be eligible for
trademark protection."
Characters and recognizable set or property items may also be
subject to trademark law and other protections." Like titles,
173. SCOTT, supra note 26, § 22.03.
174. Id.
175. Traphagen, supra note 168, at 236-37.
176. Id.
177. Martin, supra note 94, at 128. This search and clearance process is not the same as
the search and clearance process discussed below. This process determines whether there
are any registered owners, while that process also looks at unregistered and neighboring
rights as well as fractionalized ownership and unregistered transfers.
178. RAYSMAN, supra note 5, §§ 1.02[1], 6.02.
179. For a discussion of patents in this context, see David Bender, Patents and Multi-
media, in MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW 1996, supra note 4, at 87.
180. Unfair competition laws vary from state to state. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17000-17200 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
181. 1 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 2.16; see also National Lampoon, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733, 746-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (discussing the necessary
findings for passing off, unfair competition, and trademark infringement), aff'd, 497 F.2d
1343 (2d Cir. 1974).
182. See the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
183. Dennis Angel, Legal Protection for Titles in the Entertainment Industry, 52 S.
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characters, props and other elements not protected by trademark
law, may still be covered under the doctrine of unfair competi-
tion." This doctrine protects property with commercial value
against unauthorized use if the use results in confusion advanta-
geous to the user's product and harmful to the preexisting con-
tent."8
Due to the number and complexity of rights involved, the de-
veloper, working alone, is unlikely to overcome the clearance
hurdles in all but the simplest cases. 116 To surmount the obstacles,
the producer usually must retain someone with specialized knowl-
edge to research and clear the rights.1" That person will often be
an attorney. Research is time consuming, however, and attorneys
are expensive. If the licenses are complicated by geography or
fragmentation, or the creators are reluctant, the attorneys' fees
may become prohibitive. 1" This places the developer in a bind.
Seeking licenses under these circumstances may seem economi-
cally unjustifiable; producers may feel they must choose between
sacrificing the desired content and using the content without li-
censing it, thereby jeopardizing the validity of their license in the
finished product.89 The producer needs an economically efficient
way to solve this problem.
III. THE GULF: NEGOTIATING AND CONTROLLING MASS USES
A. Mass Uses
Copyright protection in the United States has evolved from
limited common law protection under the Statute of Anne,'o to the
full and detailed property rights of the current Act, as augmented
CAL. L. REV. 279 (1979); Stringfellow & Godin, supra note 85, at 3.
184. SCO'lr, supra note 26, §§ 17.01, 17.03.
185. RAYSMAN, supra note 5, § 6.09.
186. Traphagen, supra note 168, at 236-37.
187. Daniel L. Brenner, In Search of the Multimedia Grail, reprinted in EPAH, supra
note 15, at 227, 229; Litwak, supra note 15, at 200-01, 202-06, (discussing clearance and
licensing issues and recommending both an attorney and a copyright search firm).
188. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 92, at 3 (discussing the various rights that must
be cleared, the number of people who must grant permission, the parties' concerns with
licensing terms, and the difficulty of setting fees and enforcing rights); Litwak, supra note
15, at 199-200, 205-06 (discussing the "exceedingly knotty" and "bewildering array" of
issues the attorney must face in a "simple" project and recommending both an attorney
and a copyright search firm).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994).
190. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
November 19961
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
by special statutes, international treaties, and case law."' Protec-
tion for a work usually vests in its creator upon creation, and pro-
vides that creator the opportunity to exploit the work and benefit
from its use." Some situations make the ability of creators to per-
sonally control their works impractical or impossible. The area of
mass uses represents the most common case where individual con-
trol is impractical or impossible. Mass use describes a situation in
which there are many potential users over a broad geographical
expanse; there is little or no time between the decision to use the
work and its use; and it will be extremely difficult to detect infring-
ing uses."9 Radio stations and restaurants playing popular music
exemplify a mass use. In mass use situations owners cannot license
users economically, discover or enforce against infringement, or
effectively protect their political rights in relationship to that use.94
1. Economical licensing
Economical licensing occurs when the cost of negotiating and
issuing the license is less than the potential income to be generated
under the license.195 Mass uses do not support individually negoti-
ated licenses because the fixed costs of issuing the license exceed
any fee the use could support.'96 For example, individual music
publishers or artists could not possibly locate, contact, and negoti-
ate individual licenses for every potential public performance of
their work.'" Individual licensing requires rights holders to contact
every potential user, in this case every radio and television station,
club, restaurant, theatre, and performance hall that might publicly
perform their music, both in the United States and abroad."8
Source licensing, where potential users instigate licensing ne-
gotiations, minimizes the cost to rights holders.' Even under a
source licensing scheme, however, many well-intentioned users
would still become infringers due to administrative errors and un-
191. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 201.
193. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 8.2.1; see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1 (1979).
194. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 3, at 557-62.
195. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 8.2.1(a).
196. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20; KOHN & KOHN, supra note 3, at 552; Gro-
gan, supra note 4, at 268-69.
197. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20; KOHN & KOHN, supra note 3, at 552.
198. See Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 4-5.
199. Source Licensing, supra note 95, at 257-74 (prepared statement of ASCAP).
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anticipated, uncleared uses." In the case of public performance
rights in music, the number of works, creators, and users is so great
that it becomes impossible for either the owner or the user to li-
cense works individually at a cost the market will bear."' The time
and costs of administration alone would preclude them from either
using or creating any further works.'
2. Detection and prosecution of infringement
The ability to effectively exploit a product depends on the
ability to control its use. 3 Where the creator is unable to control
the use of the work, the creator loses the financial incentive to
continue creating.' Mass uses, by their very nature, do not lend
themselves to effective individual control.
Some believe that uncontrollable use should not be protected.
They argue that the basis of protection is the exclusiveness of the
exploitation, therefore, if exclusive exploitation is unattainable,
there should be no protection. 5 Thus, where a creator, individu-
ally, can neither economically license the work nor effectively pre-
vent infringement, uncontrolled use without compensation is not
an injury.'
This thinly cloaked version of "might makes right" obscures
the basis of the right, twisting the law to say that the right itself is
based on the ability to enforce it. Enforcement of a right granted
by law must be founded on the law granting that right.' Further,
the abrogation of copyright protection contradicts the intent and
the letter of the Constitution.' The Constitution grants the right
to exclusively exploit a work for a limited time after its creation.'
200. For example, "innocent" uncleared uses might include an unexpected encore in a
live performance or distribution of material mistakenly believed to be in the public do-
main.
201. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20; KoHN & KOHN, supra note 3, at 553.
202. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 8.2.1(a).
203. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (suggesting that the best way to en-
courage individual effort is to allow personal gain).
204. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,555 (1973).
205. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 8.2.1(b).
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 204 F. 998,1004 (1913).
208. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219. "The copyright law... is intended definitely to grant
valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome require-
ments; 'to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary [or artistic] works of
lasting benefit to the world."' Id. (citations omitted).
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555.
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It says nothing about enforcement, but "[t]he bite of law is in its
enforcement.""2 ' The Framers knew this and granted Congress the
power "[tlo make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers .... ,,2"' Congress
immediately enacted copyright protection.212 The original protec-
tion was for books, maps, and charts."' This was statutorily ex-
panded seven times in the 1800s," 4 prior to the introduction of the
Copyright Act of 1909."5 Congress amended the 1909 Act in 1912
to cover motion pictures and photoplays.216 The current Copyright
Act and other intellectual property statutes continue to effectuate
the exclusive right to exploit one's creations.2"7
In cases such as the musician's public performance right,218 it is
impracticable to monitor all possible infringements. This would
require monitoring all public broadcasts and performancess of a
work. Monitoring increases in difficulty as digital technology be-
comes more sophisticated because a slightly altered work may ei-
ther fail to trigger recognition, or may appear to be a different,
210. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463,484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (capitalization omitted).
212. Act of May 31,1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
213. Id. This protection has been amended and expanded to address current protec-
tion needs and encompass treaty obligations. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 63, at OV-1.
214. LEON H. AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRAcTIcE 94 (1936).
215. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amending and consolidating copyright
protection into one Act, no longer codified but still in force for some works); see 17
U.S.C.A. § 101-215.
216. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 35,37 Stat. 488; AMDUR, supra note 214, at 94.
217. U.S. copyright law is governed by title 17 of the United States Code. The Copy-
right Act of 1976 governs most issues. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-104, 105-106, 107-115, 117-118,
201-510, 601-803 (1994). However, the Copyright Act of 1909 still governs controversies
over works in existence prior to 1978. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075. A num-
ber of statutes and treaties must also be considered when addressing a copyright question.
Beyond title 17, the administrative regulations of the U.S. Copyright Office are codified
at title 37, C.F.R. Other current laws in force include: the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion (UCC), July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178; the Geneva Phonogram
Convention; the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. § 303 (1994); the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 901-914; the Satellite , ome
Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 17 U.S.C.A. & 47 U.S.C.); the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1866, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne]; the
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-182, 107 Stat.
2057 (1993); GATT, Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4976; as
well as the provisions of many bilateral treaties. Although the Uruguay Round was not
formally ratified as a treaty, it is an outgrowth of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
of which the United States is a member. Id The WTO's provisions, including all of its
intellectual property provisions, have been enacted into federal law. IaI
218. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106,114.
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noninfringing work until closely examined.2"9
This is not an unlikely scenario. Even without digital technol-
ogy, there is often confusion about whether one work actually in-
fringes another. For example, in Repp v. Lloyd Webber,. Ray
Repp, a song composer, sued Andrew Lloyd Webber claiming that
a song in Webber's Phantom of the Opera infringed Repp's song
Till You." Lloyd Webber countersued alleging that Till You in-
fringed his earlier song Close Every Door.' The court granted
summary judgment for Lloyd Webber finding no infringement of
Till You,' and in a later decision, held that Repp had infringed
Lloyd Webber's Close Every Door.4 The court then denied
Repp's motion for summary judgment and remanded Lloyd
Webber's Phantom composition to trial on the basis that Lloyd
Webber had stated a prima facie case of infringement to that com-
position as well.'
Further, what was once considered a completely separate and
noninfringing use may later be found to infringe. One example is
the extensive litigation between Apple Computer and Apple Cor-
poration over the Apple Computer's use of the Apple trademark
for computer-based music programs.' In 1981 the two companies
had signed an agreement limiting the use of their trademarks in
the United Kingdom. Apple Computer was limited to computer
products and could not use its apple for music products, of which it
had none, while Apple Corporation could use its apple trademarks
for record albums and other products related to music and the
Beatles.' Over time the expansion of computer technology
blurred the line between what constituted a music product and
what was a computer product, creating litigation over uses unfore-
seen by the 1981 agreement. '
The argument that uncontrolled use without payment does
219. Merians, supra note 110, at 244-46.
220. 858 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
221. Id at 1297.
222. Id
223. Id. at 1304. Repp failed to prove that Lloyd Webber could have, or did, infringe
Repp's song and also failed to contradict Lloyd Webber's proof of independent creation.
Id at 1301-04.
224. Repp v. Lloyd Webber, 914 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
225. Id
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not injure the creator gains credence, however, when the use is
new, or newly important.' This is especially true when it appears
that owners formerly acquiesced in the use, but have since re-
scinded their acquiescence." 1 Here, the argument is that the law
never intended to encompass the new, or newly important, use.'3
This argument was more potent under the 1909 Act. 3 The 1909
Act failed to protect against many uses that emerged from tech-
nologies not yet envisioned, even by science fiction writers, when
the Act was written.' Congress continues to revise the 1976 Act
based on new concerns and developments" thus ensuring its con-
tinuing relevance to emerging technologies."6
3. Effective political protection
Unfortunately, economics often places creators and users in
an adversarial relationship.' The user wishes to pay nothing, or as
little as possible, while the creator wishes to earn as much as pos-
sible for the use."8 Many users will not pay unless they are caught
and compelled by actual or threatened legal action.'
In a democratic society, where citizens have access to legisla-
tive authority, users command greater legislative power based
solely on their greater numbers.' Users can advance their inter-
ests by exploiting their greater numbers politically, and where
their interests are adverse to those of creators and other content
owners, the content owners' interests may go unheeded.
In addition, content providers frequently work alone, earn
below average incomes" , and lack the protection of political or-
230. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 8.2.1(b).
231. Id
232. Id
233. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075.
234. For example, it did not protect television and movies with sound, let alone com-
puters. Further, sound recordings were not protected until the Sound Recordings
Amendment Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.A.).
235. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 217.
236. See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 95, at D1.
238. Id
239. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 8.2.1(a).
240. Id § 8.2.1(c).
241. See Industry Canada: Culture Counts, M2 Communications, M2 Presswire, July
21, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (indicating that while the
cultural sector represents 2.7% of gross domestic product, cultural workers' incomes were
often substantially less than the Canadian average). In the United States a 1987 study
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ganization. Furthermore, the artistic organizations that represent
them generally serve limited and highly defined memberships, of-
ten with strict entrance requirements and quotas. '2 The best
known voice for creators in the United States is the National En-
dowment for the Arts (NEA). 3 The NEA, however, has spent re-
cent years defending its own existence and fighting for its fund-
ing.2' Further, the NEA has focused on providing education and
grant opportunities, not on the finer points of intellectual property
law.245 It is unreasonable to expect the NEA to safeguard the
rights of all content providers, especially when its constituents in-
clude both content providers and users.'
By contrast, multimedia is a product of both the computer and
entertainment industries. As such, powerful political action
committees represent its producers.u7 Even where the producer is
indicated that artists' annual incomes were only six percent lower than those of nonartists,
but conceded that the study did not include as artists anyone who listed another occupa-
tion on their census form, thereby effectively excluding a large category of artists. Even
so, the study found that some categories of artists earned as much as one-third less than
nonartists. The "Starving Artist" Is a Myth, Says New Study, PR Newswire, June 15, 1987,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS file.
242. For example, actors have three representative associations, the Screen Actors'
Guild (SAG), which covers actors in big screen entertainment and nontheatrical film; As-
sociation of Film, Television and Radio Actors (AFTRA), for actors in small screen pro-
ductions and commercials; and Actor's Equity for actors in live theatre. RAYSMAN, supra
note 5, § 1.03[4].
There are few representative associations or organizations for writers and other
creators. Screenwriters have the Writers' Guild, and there are associations for computer
graphic artists. Primarily, however, creators speak for themselves.
243. The National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-209,
79 Stat. 845 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-963 (1967)) created the NEA. 20 U.S.C. § 954.
244. See George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and the Art-
ist-Part 1, 44 R.I. BAR J., Mar. 1996, at 7, 14, 17. The NEA's 1990 budget was over $200
million. Id at 14. By 1995 it had dwindled to $167.4 million. ld The NEA presently
faces direct threats to all funding from fallout over several specific career grants to indi-
viduals. Id at 7, 14.
245. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL EN-
DOWMENT FOR THE ARTS 2 (Dec. 1991) (National Endowment for the Arts Statement of
Mission). "[T]he NEA's goal is not to provide employment, but rather to make the arts
more widely available to Americans, to preserve our culture and to encourage the crea-
tive development of our nation's finest artistic talent." Rene6 Linton, Comment, The Ar-
tistic Voice: Is It in Danger of Being Silenced?, 32 CAL. W. L. REv. 195, 198-99 (1995).
246. See generally, NEA, 1994 ANN. REP., 11 (1995). The NEA publishes a compre-
hensive list of individual awards on the World Wide Web. Id at 12. Current listings by
state are available at <http://gopher.tmn.com:70/0/Artswire/Govarts/NEAINEAINFO>,
visited Sept. 30,1996 (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
247. Powerful associations such as the Software Developer's Association, IEEE, the
National Broadcaster's Association, and the Motion Picture Association of America have
the clout to act politically for their members, whether or not they organize as a formal
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part of a small, entrepreneurial enterprise, the enterprise may be
represented by the same associations as its more powerful com-
petitors. In addition, as a business, multimedia producers' inter-
ests are further represented by the Small Business Administration,
the Chamber of Commerce, and many other active and well-
funded political action groups.2' Agaiist this background, indi-
vidual creators have few viable political options in a mass use
situation."9
4. Resolving the tension
There are three possible resolutions to the tension between
providing an effective and economical means for legally exploiting
preexisting content and preserving the exclusivity of the creators'
right to the greatest extent possible. First, one may determine that
the use is not within the creator's exclusive right to exploit, and
therefore do nothing.' This route, however, is contrary to the
Constitution and the history of intellectual property rights in this
country." Further, it heavily favors users over creators. Second,
one may establish statutory controls and nonvoluntary licensing. 2
This may be the user's preference, but the courts disfavor nonvol-
untary licensing.' While this option is better than the first, it still
strips creators of almost all control over their work. Third, one
may provide some form of collective administration, usually in
conjunction with one or more blanket licenses. Collective admini-
stration resolves many of the economic and enforcement issues
that arise in a mass use and can be structured to preserve the bulk
of the creators' individual rights.'
political action committee (PAC). Others, like the Chamber of Commerce, operate as
PACs, reflecting the concerns of their broader membership. Between the two kinds of
associations, both the industry specific and general business needs of the multimedia pro-
ducer will be addressed.
248. See, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-634g (1994); 15 U.S.C.A. § 634 (West Supp. 1996) (setting
out the purpose and establishing the Small Business Administration and the Office of Ad-
vocacy).
249. See SINACORE-GuINN, supra note 31, § 1.22.
250. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
251. 1 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 1.07.
252. See discussion infra Part V.A.
253. JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.03[2][b]
(1995).
254. See discussion infra Part IV.
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B. Multimedia as a Mass Use
Multimedia shares the characteristics of a mass use. 5 There
are many potential users and content providers distributed over a
broad geographical expanse. Because the technology requires lit-
tle initial capital, there is no way to track users who may be work-
ing with recognized organizations or out of their personal studio.
Few multimedia producers have the time or budget to enter into
protracted negotiations over any largely fungible work. 6 If a crea-
tor is not immediately cooperative or the creator's rights are too
fragmented, there are many other works that will suffice for most
projects. Even in the best of circumstances, the use does not sup-
port the time the creator will have to spend to administer an indi-
vidual license. The costs of individual clearance and negotiation
exceed stringent multimedia project budgets.' Finally, it is ex-
tremely difficult for creators to detect or prevent infringing uses in
digital media.
C. Power Gulfs
From both an economic and a political perspective, content
creators' bargaining power is severely limited. In most cases crea-
tors and other rights holders will be helpless to prevent digital in-
fringement." They may not have the resources or tools to exam-
ine new products developed by producers to whom they have
refused licenses, and even if they examine the products, they may
be unable to immediately detect any infringing use."
Multimedia is part of the computer and entertainment indus-
tries. Although on tight budgets, multimedia producers are often
well capitalized or have ready access to capital.' Many are
255. See discussion supra Part III.A.
256. Just how fungible a work is will depend largely on why it is being used. A sunset,
some classical looking statuary, textiles in a particular shade, or a few bars of the blues
will all be relatively interchangeable, but if the producer wants Pavarotti then Bono just
won't do.
257. Profitability constrains the budgets of even well capitalized endeavors, which also
must work within the limits placed by the product's anticipated retail price and wholesale
volume. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 92, at 60-61.
258. Brenner, supra note 187, at 229-30.
259. Merians, supra note 110, at 245.
260. For example, Dreamworks SKG started business with hundreds of millions of
dollars of capital investment and a $1 billion line of credit with Chemical Bank. Andrew
E. Serwer, Analyzing the Dream, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 1995, at 71. Paul Allen, cofounder
of Microsoft, put up $500 million, Microsoft kicked in $30 million, and Ziff Brothers In-
vestments anticipated about a $27 million investment. d The Chemical Bank line of
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backed by, or owned by, major entertainment or software corpo-
rations."' They are seen by investors as an emerging technology
and an interesting risk. 2
Some well-funded developers have taken the stance that li-
censing is too disorderly, and it would be easier to create the work
anew.' Others with adequate capital purchase images, archives,
libraries, and museum collections, including all the intellectual
property rights to the works. Bill Gates is among the latter group.
Through his company, Corbis Corp., Gates is amassing a vast col-
lection of images to which Corbis owns the digital rights.2 In
April, 1996 Corbis had a digital collection of 600,000 images in
addition to the 16 million image Bettmann archive, which includes
credit is especially notable because Dreamworks is a new, untried company, and this im-
mense credit was extended at a time when the Disney Company, with decades of success
behind it, had only just negotiated this kind of credit with Citibank. Citibank to Serve as
Disney Tour Guide, 10 INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, INC., Apr. 3, 1995, § 14, avail-
able in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File ("Citibank is arranging a $1 billion
credit"); Citi in Thick of Disney, Union Pacific Deals, 10 INVESTMENT DEALERS'
DIGEST, INC., Aug. 7, 1995, § 32, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File
("Citibank put together a $1 billion refinancing for the entertainment giant in the
spring").
261. Microsoft and the other major computer manufacturers are quite competitive in
this arena, as are some of the major film studios. For example, Time Warner has Warner
Interactive, which itself has joint ventures with companies such as Kawasaki. Time War-
ner Interactive and Kawasaki Motors Corp. Team Up to Release "Kawasakio Superbike
Challengem," PR Newswire, Mar. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File; see also Marilyn A. Gillen, Inscape to Absorb Two Warner Interactive
Units, BILLBOARD, Oct. 28, 1995, at 12, 107; Time Warner Cable of New York City Signs
Agreement With IPC Interactive, Inc., PR Newswire, July 11, 1996 available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File; Time Warner to Join Interactive Digital Solutions as Eq-
uity Partner; AT&T, Silicon Graphics and Time Warner Join Forces to Accelerate the In-
teractive Age, Bus. Wire, Apr. 25, 1995 available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS
File.
Dreamworks Interactive is a joint venture between Dreamworks/SKG and Micro-
soft. All Things Considered: Microsoft and Dreamworks SKG Announce Joint Venture
(NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 22, 1995) (transcript on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review). New Century Network (NCN) is an online news source funded by a group of
nine media companies. J. Greg Phelan, Hot off the Web: Interested in the News? You Can
Find It on the Internet Or, It Can Find You, STAR-LEDGER, June 24, 1996 at 19,21.
262. High technology investment is such a "hot" area that Investor's Business Daily
runs a special column, "Computers and Technology," four issues a week.
263. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
264. Gates has purchased rights to several thousand images from the State Hermitage
Museum in St. Petersburg, Russia; the National Gallery of London; the Philadelphia Mu-
seum of Art; the Bettmann Archive; and the Ansel Adams Publishing Rights Trust. Cor-
bis Corp.: Company, Started By Gates, Buys Digital Art Images, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7,
1995, at B4; Famed Images of West: Gates' Firm Expands Photo Library, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
3, 1996, § 3, at 3; Corbis Corporation Backgrounder, <http://www.corbis.com>, visited
July 1,1996 (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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the entire UPI newsphoto collection.2' Corbis is digitizing 25,000
images per week and its digital library will reach one million im-
ages by the end of 1996.' This type of amassment essentially mo-
nopolizes the intellectual property rights to the bulk of the world's
most famous images in the hands of one producer and could ex-
clude competition from the multimedia marketplace. However,
Corbis is committed to "taking a leadership role in protecting in-
tellectual property rights in the digital age," by "becoming the
world's premier provider of high-quality digital content," and
"provid[ing] easy access to the rich visual heritage of the world."'267
Finally, whether the producer's business is large and powerful
or a one-person outfit, the producer is the buyer of a largely fun-
gible commodity.' This widens the gulf between the producer and
the creator because the producer, as a buyer, does not need any
particular seller and can simply walk away from unpalatable terms.
In this respect the content market closely resembles economists'
models for perfect competition; no provider has any greater mar-
ket power than any other. 9 If, after walking away, the producer
approaches another creator, she acts as anticipated in a normal
competitive market." She may, however, simply use the work
without attribution or payment."
Contract law does not account for the possibility that the ob-
ject of an agreement can be acquired without reaching any agree-
ment. It is, instead, based on the principle that parties have rela-
tively equal bargaining power and the freedom to contractY22 It
prescribes remedies where failure of this principle works an injus-
265. M. Sharon Baker, Ansel Adams Deal Clicked Due to Corbis' Previous CD-ROM,
PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Apr. 5,1996, at 6.
266. Robert Uhlig, Innovations: Build Up Your Own Art Collection, DAILY
TELEGRAPH LONDON, Jan. 30, 1996, at 14.
267. Corbis Corporation Backgrounder, <http://www.corbis.com> [Press Releases:
Backgrounder] (collected July 1, 1996). Corbis' images are marked with an invisible wa-
termark that prevents and helps trace unlicensed high-resolution infringement, Part of
Corbis' extensive commitment to protecting copyright. Id. at <http://www//corbis.com-
/archive/arc-copy.hmtl>.
268. Since anything that can be created in, or converted to, digital form can become
content, the vast amount of such content means that, for most purposes, there will be
other images the producer can use if her first choice is unavailable.
269. Douglas A. Smith, Collective Administration of Copyright: An Economic Analysis,
8 RaS. L. & ECON. 137, 142-48 & figs.1-2 (1986) (discussing competition policy and eco-
nomics of copyright licensing).
270. Id at 143-44 & fig.1.
271. Id.; Neilson Interview, supra note 28.
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12, cmt. c (1979).
November 1996]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:215
tice.' But the freedom of contract on which contract law is
founded assumes that the parties can choose whether to agree.'
Where the individual creator has neither the power to prevent, nor
the ability to detect infringing use of his work, he has no real
choice but to acquiesce in its use. The content owner in this situa-
tion realistically has no freedom to negotiate a contract and no re-
course for its breach.f5 In this case the creator must turn to a col-
lective administration organization to preserve the utility of those
rights."S
IV. COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION
A collective administration organization is an entity organized
to "represent the economic and moral interests of creative rights
owners" by administering "the economic and moral rights of a
significant proportion of a nation's creators in their works."' Es-
sentially, the collective manages the day-to-day business of li-
censed uses. A collective may grant licenses, monitor uses, inves-
tigate and enforce against infringement, and collect and distribute
license fees."
A. Prototypes
The most commonly understood American model of collec-
tive administration is the Collective Licensing Organization
(CLO) typified by ASCAP and BMI,2 9 the music performing
rights societies.' These two agencies administer blanket licenses'
to radio and television stations and places of public performance
273. See, e.g., id. §§ 211-12 (contracts of adhesion); id. § 208 (unconscionability); id. §§
152-54 (mistake).
274. I §§ 50-70 (failure of offer or acceptance); i §§ 159-77 (fraud, duress); id.
§ 211-12 (contracts of adhesion).
275. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiff state a prima facie
case, or a statement of factual allegations that, if believed, would result in legal conse-
quences. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(1). Inability to detect the offensive conduct will preclude the
plaintiff from stating a prima facie case, making legal and equitable remedies unavailable.
In this situation, rights holders may even know that their work has been used, but still be
unable to state a claim that will survive a motion for dismissal or summary judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56.
276. See discussion infra Part IV.
277. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 4.6.
278. Id.
279. ASCAP and BMI are the acronyms and commonly known names of the Ameri-
can Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers and Broadcast Music, Inc.
280. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 4.7.2.
281. Blanket licenses are discussed infra Parts V.C-D.
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such as nightclubs, restaurants, stores, and theatres for unlimited
nondramatic public performances of their entire repertoires for a
prescribed period of time.' They monitor, collect, and distribute
licensing fees to their members as well as enforce their members'
rights and lobby Congress for the protection of those rights.' In
addition, these are the only two successfully competing music per-
formance rights agencies.'
The CLO is appropriate, and utilized, for administering other
rights as well. Cable retransmission, fine arts display, and repro-
graphic reproduction rights are also administered by CLOs.' Ca-
ble retransmission rights allow cable television systems to broad-
cast network programming for customers who cannot receive
television without cable. 6 Cable systems pay a nominal royalty to
the television station to rebroadcast the day's programming.' Be-
cause broadcasting is a highly regulated industry, the CLO negoti-
ates the contracts within strict statutory requirements.' It then
administers the collection and distribution of that nominal roy-
alty. 9 The CLO's greatest benefit is that it relieves the individual
stations from the need to devote significant resources to monitor-
ing and managing these rights.'
Fine arts display includes the right to display works in public
places such as museums and galleries, in film and television sets,
and in documentaries.' Fine arts display rights are much more
common in European countries than they are in the United
States.2' The U.S. rights in this area are limited to a few situations
addressed under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).93
Reprographic reproduction rights include copy and storage
rights for photocopies, microfiche, and electronic storage." Re-
282. See United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No.
Civ. 13-95,1985 WL 257, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,1985).
283. E.g., Source Licensing, supra note 95, at 257-74 (prepared statement of ASCAP).
284. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, §§ 5.1-5.4, 818
285. Itd.
286. See id. § 6.2.3(a).
287. Id.
288. See idt §§ 6.2.3, 8.5.4 (statutory blanket license).
289. Id § 6.2.3.
290. See id §§ 6.2.3, 15.1-15.1.2, 15.9.
291. Id § 6.2.3(c).
292. Ia
293. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.A.).
294. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 6.2.3(d).
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prographic rights have three components: transgraphic copying, in
which the object is photocopied onto paper; transoptic copying,
where the work is copied to a film medium; and electrocopying,
where the work is copied to an electronic medium, such as copying
from one drive to another on a computer."' Major corporations
and research institutions are the primary licensees in the repro-
graphic rights area.296
CLOs are not the only form of collective administration.
Agency Collective Organizations (ACOs) offer individual owners
substantial control over their work.Y ACOs are appropriate for
low volume use of defined works, and are used for administering
dramatic, fine arts publishing, mechanical, synchronization, and
transcription rights. "8 At this minimal level of collectivization,
there are other options for private administration of rights. In the
United States, artists' agents and representatives typically perform
this function, thus ACOs are uncommon.
2
9
Collection and Distribution Administrations (CDAs) gener-
ally do not control rights. Instead, they administer remuneration
rights under a statutory licensing scheme.' In the United States,
CDAs principally administer royalties under the Audio Home Re-
cording Act, - which deals with digital audio tape (DAT) record-
ers and media." DAT recorders and media were introduced only
after protracted battles with recording companies and musicians'
representatives." The Act lays out the manufacturers' obligation
to pay royalties, payment methods, and distribution of royalty
payments from the sale of digital audio recorders and tapes."4 The
Act also permits digital and analog home taping of copyrighted
material for noncommercial use, thus legalizing the widespread
practice of taping CDs for personal use.' Personal copying per-
295. ld.
296. See id. The Copyright Clearance Center handles blanket licenses for corporate
and research copying. See id.
297. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 6.2.2.
298. See id.
299. See id. § 6.2.1.
300. Id. § 6.2.4.
301. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)).
302- Id.
303. See H.R. REP. No. 102-873, pts. 1, 11, (1992) reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N., 3578,
3578-3608.
304. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1003-1007 (West & Supp. 1996).
305. Id. § 1008.
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mitted under the Act includes both full works and self-edited
compilations.'
In other jurisdictions public lending rights and droit de suite
are important rights that can be administered by a CDA.' Public
lending rights enable the owner to receive a royalty from the
lending of their work by a public library.'
Droit de suite grants fine artists the right to participate in the
after-market for their original works by receiving royalties on con-
tinuing resales.' Droit de suite has not been as successful in the
United States as it has in other jurisdictions. As recently as 1993,
the record industry argued that resale of used CDs without royalty
payments was a violation of artists' rights .3 " Record companies
withheld co-op advertising from stores that sold both new and used
CDs to protest the practice."' The Wherehouse, the largest retail
chain involved, and the Independent Music Retailers Association
shot back with a class action antitrust suit against the four major
record labels.3"2 The suit eventually settled out of court and the
practice continues. 33 Despite its lack of acceptance in the United
States, droit de suite is important to the multimedia industry be-
cause intellectual property rights are increasingly international in
scope, and because nations are increasingly bound by multilateral
treaties that grant standard minimum levels of artists' rights.1 4
Social Collectives (SCs) are the most invasive form of collec-
tive because they ignore the private property basis of creators'
rights.3"5 Under this system, fees are generated under a statutory
306. Id.
307. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, §§ 6.2.4(a), 6.2.4(c).
308. Id §§ 3.10.1(h), 6.2.4(c).
309. Id. §§ 6.2.4(a), 15.1.
310. See Eileen Fitzpatrick, Wherehouse Tries Used-Tape Sales, BILLBOARD, Jan. 28,
1995, at 1,13.
311. Id.
312. Ed Christman, Distributors Offer Used-CD Sellers Ad-Dollar Paybacks,
BILLBOARD, Feb. 26,1994, at 6.
313. Id.; see Fitzpatrick, supra note 310, at 13.
314. GATT includes a section on intellectual property transfers that largely mirrors
the Berne Convention. GATT, supra note 130, art. 69. Both GAIT and Berne enforce
compliance to their terms by threat of exclusion. GAIT's enforcement powers signifi-
cantly outweigh Berne's, however, because exclusion from GAIT damages a nation's en-
tire trading sector, with profound implications for the nations' gross national product and
economy. Id. Conversely, exclusion from Berne affects relatively few individuals and its
effect on a nation's economy is not generally distinguishable. Berne, supra note 217, art.
11 bis, 3(1), 14 ter; GAT, supra note 130, art. 69.
315. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 4.7.4.
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license, or a tax.3"6 Royalties received by SCs are placed in a com-
mon pool for collective benefits such as grants, awards, and subsi-
dies, or they are used for the common societal good.317 This type of
collective more closely matches a socialized economy and is used
in Nordic countries.318 However, if a society wishes to promote the
use of new works by charging a licensing fee for using folklore or
works in the public domain, this is the only appropriate type of
collective.1 9
B. Multimedia Needs
As a mass use, multimedia licensing shares many of the char-
acteristics and administrative needs of licensing the public per-
formance, reproduction, and distribution of music.' Both have
too many providers; works that may be treated as fungible; and too
many users to make individual, private licensing feasible. 2' Both
grapple with the creators' individual inability to enforce their
rights, and with transactional costs of individual licensing that ex-
ceed the fees the uses can support?
A multimedia licensing collective must be able to effectively
license many different kinds of works and administer either a to-
tally new kind of license or a package of traditional licenses. Tra-
ditionally, collectives administer either the works of only one kind
of creator, for example, photographers, or only one category of
use, for example, dramatic, reprographic, or cable retransmission
rights.3"
Cable retransmission, however, provides a working example
of two different ways to administer a right that requires more than
one kind of license from more than one owner or collective.24 The
cable operator needs all the rights of transmission for all the pro-




319. Id. § 6.2.5. The creators in this case are either unknown or their rights have ex-
pired, extinguishing the primary purpose of other collectives.
320. See discussion supra Part III.B.
321. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1979).
322. Id.
323. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, at 818-20. As David Sinacore-Guinn discusses
the administration of each type of rights, he provides a nation-by-nation list of the CROs
administering those rights. Id. §§ 13.6.1-4,14.9.1-2,15.9, 16.10, 17.9.1-3, 18.7, 19.4.
324. Id. § 13.5.2.
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and a license from the commercial stations for the right to use
their "broadcast day. ' 2
In one model, the various collectives cooperate first by nego-
tiating among themselves how the total licensing revenue will be
divided, then by building a team comprised of representatives
from each member collective to negotiate their best deal with the
cable operator." Unless the music performing rights societies
elect to administer their rights independently, the collectives typi-
cally appoint one of the "larger and more well-established" mem-
bers to actually administer the license.32 In the United States, ca-
ble retransmission rights are covered by a compulsory license
administered by the Copyright Office."
The second model is more instructive for multimedia. In
Scandinavian countries the various collectives involved in the li-
censing of cable television retransmission rights joined together to
form a new collective for the exclusive purpose of administering all
the rights cable system operators needed to license for this particu-
lar use.29 The various individual collectives form the membership
of the new collective organization, which then administers all col-




This model has several distinct advantages for multimedia. It
allows for the affiliation of many different kinds of rights owners in
the same collective.33' Negotiation of rights occurs between collec-
tives and not between the individual rights holders,332 thereby
minimizing the danger of creating animosity between different
types of rights owners by keeping all proceedings at a professional
325. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367,
377-79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
326. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 13.5.2.
327. Id.
328. 17 U.S.C.A. § 111(c)-(d) (West & Supp. 1996). Cable retransmission rights were
formerly administered by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, but that office has been dis-
banded statutorily. lId § 111(d)(4); National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 675 F.2d at 377-79.
See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 119 (West & Supp. 1996) (satellite retransmission compulsory li-
cense).
329. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 13.5.2.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. This is because the new collective's direct members are the various collectives
already handling the creator's works and not the creators and other rights holders them-
selves.
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distance.33 Because the members are collectives, the new collec-
tive is "born" with the aggregate repertoires of its member collec-
tives. Adequate repertoire is the most critical component in the
initial success of a collective.3 If a collective does not have an
adequate repertoire, it will gain neither new affiliate owners nor
new licensees. 35 This is especially important when technology cre-
ates a new use, such as multimedia, that needs multiple licensing or
a new type of license incorporating elements from several kinds of
available licenses. 6
It does not help the multimedia producer, any more than the
cable system operator, to license the rights from one owner only to
discover that there are other owners with prior claims to some
portion of the rights the producer needs. Consider again the mul-
timedia producer seeking to license a film clip." The developer
needs to license both the clip and the music.3" In addition to a
master license and licenses for synchronization and public per-
formance, the developer will need to clear the public display rights
for any art as well as publicity for any persons, characters, or
prominently displayed trade or service marks that appear recog-
nizably in the clip.339 If the film is based on another work still pro-
tected by copyright, the producer will need to ensure that the
owner of the underlying work has not granted an exclusive license
to the derivative rights elsewhere.'
These verifications require information that the various mem-
ber collectives already possess because they themselves license the
material and must warrant its availability. They will have warran-
ties from the creators as to the works' availability. If they do not
have the information, they have a preexisting relationship with the
rights holder and are better able to discover and remedy any
problems.
333. Id. § 13.5.2.
334. See id § 8.7.
335. See id
336. See id at 817-18.
337. See supra Part II.C.
338. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
339. Clearing House, supra note 24, at 10-11; Scott & Talbot, supra note 171, at 2;
Stringfellow & Godin, supra note 85, at 5.




Copyright grants creators a legal monopoly on their work'
while federal antitrust laws are designed to prevent monopolies
and anticompetitive restraints on trade.4" Intellectual property
rights holders' monopoly in their work presents a limited excep-
tion to the antitrust laws.-3 However, antitrust concerns are never
far from the surface and attempts by creators to collectively ad-
minister their work has raised the question whether such a collec-
tive violates antitrust laws or principles.4
Transfers of intellectual property are governed by section 7 of
the Clayton Act,35 sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.47 While it is unlikely
that the transfer of individual content items would create an anti-
trust concern, much less meet the $15 million threshold for a Jus-
tice Department or Federal Trade Commission filing, collective
administration has and may continue to raise antitrust concerns: 4
A collective administration organization will be examined un-
der antitrust laws as a joint venture:' For antitrust purposes, a
joint venture is "a separate enterprise characterized by an integra-
tion of operations between and subject to control by its parent
firms which results in the creation of significant new enterprise ca-
pability in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a
341. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-102,201 (1996).
342. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
343. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,132, § 4.3, at 22-23 (Apr. 6, 1995)
[hereinafter DOJ Guidelines].
344. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 2 (1979).
345. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
346. Id. §§ 1-2.
347. Id. § 45; see DOJ Guidelines, supra note 343, § 5.7.
348. 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW §
12.03, n.6 (1996).
349. ASCAP and BMI have repeatedly fought antitrust challenges to their collective
administration and blanket licensing of public performance rights in music. See, e.g.,
Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 1; Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Soc'y of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984); CBS, Inc. v. American
Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH)
56,104, at 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) [hereinafter ASCAP I], as modified by United States v.
American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) [hereinafter ASCAP 1].
350. COMPACT v. Metropolitan Gov't, 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1574 (M.D. Tenn. 1984);
Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20-23.
November 1996]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW
new product, or entry into a new market."35' Joint ventures pose a
conceptual difficulty for antitrust law because they "defy[] neat
classification and precise definition and, by extension, well estab-
lished rules for evaluating their competitive impact."352
Collective administrations are seen as joint ventures because
they integrate the content owners' intellectual property assets and
consolidate licensing management in order for content owners to
compete efficiently by achieving integrative efficiencies such as
economies of scale, shared risks, facilitating entry to new markets,
and the consequent synergies of pooling complementary re-
sources.353 As joint ventures, their formation is subject to a "rule
of reason" analysis.'M
To establish a collective administration organization that con-
forms to antitrust guidelines, one must consider two principles: (1)
whether the collective administration organization's effect on price
and output are ancillary to a legitimate product or service not
available in the absence of a cooperative organization, that is,
whether the procompetitive integrative efficiencies outweigh any
anticompetitive practices;355 and (2) whether the collective admini-
stration organization unreasonably restricts competition and is
narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose.356
1. Are the competitive restrictions ancillary to a legitimate purpose
and the venture's integrative efficiencies?
Section 1 of the Sherman Act bans conspiracies and restraints
of trade between competitors." Price fixing between direct com-
petitors is known as a "horizontal price restraint" and constitutes a
per se violation of antitrust laws "8 except where such a price re-
straint is actually ancillary to procompetitive integrative efficien-
351. COMPACT, 594 F. Supp. at 1574.
352. Id.
353. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20-23; COMPACT, 594 F. Supp. at 1574; ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 372-73 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing
procompetitive integrative efficiencies) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST].
354. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc.,
441 U.S. at 23-24; see also ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 353, 373-392 (discussing joint
venture analysis in detail).
355. ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 353, at 373.
356. Id. at 377.
357. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
358. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1927); see Broadcast
Music, Inc. 441 U.S. at 23.
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cies.3 9 When content owners band together as a collective and set
a common price for a license, they engage in a literal price re-
straint,"W but the Supreme Court has found that a blanket license
could not "be wholly equated with a simple horizontal arrange-
ment among competitors. 3 61 The legality of such an action is,
therefore, dependent on it being "subordinate and collateral" 2 to
a legitimate, separate purpose or transaction."
a. purpose
The Supreme Court recognizes that some activities must be
accomplished jointly or not at all." The purpose of a collective
administration organization is to enable rights holders to market
their property in a mass use situation where, individually, they are
"inherently unable to compete fully effectively""36 and to require a
jointly operated entity to create and define a competitive market.66
The Broadcast Music367 Court examined the collective administra-
tion and blanket licensing of the public performance right in music.
In Broadcast Music over forty thousand composers, authors, and
publishers agreed to allow ASCAP and BMI to license their works
for a fee."6 ASCAP and BMI issued blanket licenses that required
the licensee to license the entire repertoire and, except in certain
circumstances, the collectives were not allowed to license individ-
ual works.69 On examination the Court found that the collectives'
combination of licensing, monitoring, copyright enforcement, and
the consequent integrative efficiencies resulted in a new product
that could not otherwise exist ° and the license that the coopera-
359. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-03; Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 13-16; Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-41 (1918). Integrative efficiencies
include such things as economies of scale, improved efficiency from pooling common re-
sources, enhanced ability to enter new markets, and the allocated benefit of shared risk.
ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 353, at 372-73.
360. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 8-9.
361. Id. at 23.
362. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,224 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Bork, J.).
363. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft,
C.J.), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
364. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101.
365. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 22-23.
366. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101,120.
367. 441 U.S. 1.
368. Id. at 5.
369. Id. at 5,11.
370. Id. at 21-22, 23.
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tives issued was "quite different than anything any individual
owner could issue."" Thus, the Court determined the blanket li-
cense was ancillary both to the purpose of the collective and to the
integrative efficiencies the arrangement provided rights holders
and licensees.' Consequently, it held a per se analysis was inap-
propriate and reversed the Second Circuit holding that ASCAP
and BMI were in violation of the antitrust laws.3
Although its analysis overturned the court of appeals' per se
ruling, the Supreme Court did not claim to have done a rule of rea-
son analysis in Broadcast Music. It specifically left open the door
that under a rule of reason analysis, especially under changed cir-
cumstances, the ASCAP and BMI blanket licenses might fail to
pass muster.7' A rule of reason analysis requires a challenger to
show that the challenged joint venture is an unreasonable restraint
of trade. This showing requires examination of the joint ventures
effect on competition.375
2. What is the collective's effect on competition and has it narrowly
tailored its activities to its purpose?
At the heart of antitrust is the question, will this practice ad-
versely affect competition? 6 In order to address the impact on
competition, one must look at whether the joint venture has mar-
ket power and what effect the joint venture has on the relevant
market.' In Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,37 the
Court said that the effect must be examined "in light of the com-
petitive situation in 'the product market as a whole."' ' Thus, joint
ventures that are narrowly tailored to achieve their procompetitive
goals and to maintain competition among their members in other
markets are generally viewed more favorably by the courts."
371. Ld. at 23.
372. Id. at 21.
373. Id. at 18,23-24.
374. It at 21 & n.34, 24.
375. ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 353, at 41.
376. National Soc'y of Prof'i Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); see DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 343, §§ 3.1-3.2; ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 353, at 43; Addanki
& Anderson, supra note 287, at 579-80.
377. ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 353, at 44-46 & n.259.
378. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
379. lt at 45 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382
(1967), overruled on other grounds by, Continental T.V., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
380. ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 353, at 377; see, e.g., United States v. Alcan Alumi-
num Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
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a. impact on competition
A joint venture can negatively impact competition when the
joint venturers previously were actual or potential competitors in
the relevant market.38' If such a joint venture results in market
power or anticompetitive effects sufficient to outweigh its pro-
competitive justifications, it will not survive a rule of reason
analysis.3"
Normally, a reasonableness analysis requires an in-depth ex-
amination of market power." There is an exception. When the
challenged activity's effect on competition is "obvious on its
face,"' " only a "quick look" is necessary."8 In United States v.
Ivaco, Inc.,"M the court found that Ivaco's joint venture resulted in
a preemptively monopolistic market share in the relevant market,
completely integrated the parties' assets, and eliminated competi-
tion between the parties."8 The Ivaco joint venture created a
negative impact on competition that could not be overcome by the
defendants' procompetitive justification that the joint venture al-
lowed entry to a new market."8
In Broadcast Music the appellate court found BMI and
ASCAP's blanket licensing practices to be the kind of restraint on
competition found in Ivaco and, therefore, unlawful per se.89 After
examining the collectives' blanket licenses within the competitive
reality of music licensing, the Supreme Court disagreed.3" The
Supreme Court found that collectives such as ASCAP and BMI
seemed "designed to 'increase economic efficiency and render
markets more, rather than less, competitive.'
' 391
b. narrow tailoring
The Supreme Court considered the milieu in which the blan-
381. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964); United States v.
Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
382. See ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 353, at 376-78.
383. Id. at 51-52.
384. Id at 51.
385. Id. at 51-52 & n.281.
386. 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
387. Id at 1426-27.
388. Id.
389. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 6.
390. Id. at 24-25.
391. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20; accord Northwest Wholesale Stationers,
Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (retail stationers' coopera-
tive).
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ket license arose; a world inhabited by thousands of users and
thousands of composers with millions of compositions." It noted
that "[m]ost users want unplanned, rapid, and indemnified access
to any and all of the repertory of compositions, and the owners
want a reliable method of collecting for the use of their copy-
rights."3 It recognized that CBS alone would require between
4,000 and 8,000 individual licenses each year" and that the finan-
cial burden of individual sales transactions, monitoring, and en-
forcement would be prohibitive for the individual composer and
the smaller user.395 It determined the blanket license was com-
posed of the rights to use the individual pieces and the aggregating
service that ASCAP and BMI provided.39 As such, the Court de-
cided that blanket and individual licenses were different products"
and concluded, "to the extent the blanket license is a different
product, ASCAP is not really a joint sales agency offering the in-
dividual goods of many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its
blanket license, of which the individual compositions are raw ma-
terial." '98 The Court recognized that individual licensors could not
offer the same product and benefit to the licensee under any cir-
cumstances because the aggregation of compositions lowered costs
below what any licensor could offer."9
For a restraint of trade to be reasonable, its legitimate purpose
must outweigh its anticompetitive effects.' The Court addressed
whether ASCAP and BMI's blanket license created a substantial
adverse impact on competition. It determined that the aggrega-
tion aspect of the license met the users' needs by providing imme-
diate, unlimited access to the repertoire on an unplanned, flexible
basis, while simultaneously providing composers with reliable pro-
tection against infringement, a substantial reduction in transaction
costs, and reliable collection efforts."' These elements created a
different market in which individual composers could not effec-
392. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20.
393. Id.
394. Id at 21, n.35.
395. Id. at 20.
396. Id. at 21.
397. Id. at 20-21, 23.
398. Id at 22.
399. Id at 21-22.
400. Id. at 21; Interface Group v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir.
1987).




The Court also found that four elements increased competi-
tion between composers and two of these elements even affected
composers from within the license framework.' The first element
was the nature of the product.4 4 Because a musical piece can be
simultaneously consumed by many users, the blanket license was
unlikely to create a decrease in output.' 5 The second element con-
cerned the basis on which the license remunerated composers. 41'
Royalties were paid, based on the popularity of the song, thereby
encouraging composers to create marketable material.' The cu-
mulative effect of these two factors suggests that competition will
increase because composers will be best remunerated when they
create many popular songs.
The third factor the Court weighed heavily was the prior his-
tory of litigation and blanket licensing.4° The Court noted that,
historically, the market for public performing rights licenses has
largely organized around a blanket license, that Congress created
various blanket licenses by statute in the 1976 Copyright Act,
411
and that ASCAP and BMI have both operated under consent de-
crees, 41' which have "scrutinized, 412 the collective administration of
a blanket license in great depth and constructed a framework
within which ASCAP and BMI both operate.4 3 While the Court
recognized that such consent decrees were not binding upon either
it or CBS, it chided the court of appeal for not considering them
more fully.
414
Finally, the Court stressed the nonexclusive nature of the li-
cense.415 Neither users nor composers were precluded from indi-
vidually negotiating a public performance license.4 6 The Court has
402. 1i.
403. 1I. at 20-23 & n.40.
404. Id. at 22.
405. Id. at 22 nA0.




410. Id at 15-16.
411. Id at 11-12.
412. Id. at 13.
413. Id at 13-16.
414. Id. at 13.
415. Id at 23-24.
416. Id
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emphasized this aspect in subsequent cases,41' noting that the col-
lective agreement placed no restrictions "on the right of any indi-
vidual copyright owner to sell his own compositions separately to
any buyer at any price.
418
V. LICENSES
Of the various ways to legally use copyright material, most
developers will need to acquire licenses to use preexisting works. 9
Works can be licensed on several bases. A license is "any transfer
of [protected] rights short of assignment" or "authority granted by
the owner of a [protected work] to another person empowering the
latter to make or use the [work] for a limited period or in a limited
territory. ' '4' A license is limited in scope and can be exclusive or
nonexclusive, voluntary or statutory.4
An exclusive license grants the licensee a monopoly within the
arena of use." After granting an exclusive license, the owner is no
longer able to license the work to another person within the same
industry or for a similar use. Clearly an exclusive license is an
advantage to the multimedia producer who seeks to license the
"Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles" or some other highly recogniz-
able characters or work.4" Because an exclusive license impairs
the owner's ability to continue exploiting a market,4" exclusive li-
censing should be negotiated directly with the rights holder or his
agent. In general, however, exclusive licensing is probably unnec-
417. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
418. &kL at 355.
419. See Brinson & Radcliffe, supra note 120, at 23-24. There are several ways to use
copyright material legally. SCOTT, supra note 26, § 22.01 (licenses and releases);
O'Connell, supra note 14, at 7 (sales or assignments and licenses). Some work may be
used under the "fair use" doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994), but fair use is an affirmative
defense found where the proverbial "fools rush in [and] angels fear to tread." AL-
EXANDER POPE, ESSAY ON CRITICISM, line 625 in POPE: POETICAL WORKS 64, 81
(Herbert Davis ed., Oxford University Press 1966). It is a quaking bog full of traps and
poison mists, not to be entered without a trustworthy guide and a solid walking stick.
Chisum and Jacobs dedicate sixty-four pages to discussing affirmative defenses to copy-
right infringement and they consume 48 of the 64 pages on fair use. DONALD CHISUM &
MICHAEL JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 4F[3]-4F[4]
(1992).
420. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 920 (6th ed. 1990).
421. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) cmt. (1994).
422- Id; Dietel v. Chisholm, 42 F.2d 172,173 (1930).
423. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 7.
424. Id
425. Id at 6,7.
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essary and too expensive for most multimedia productions.
Licenses are limited in scope, and hence, constitute a lesser
grant than an assignment.' Licenses may be limited by duration,
geography, market, or use.4" From a creator's point of view, the
scope of the license is the most important provision in a licensing
agreement.4' Creators will probably be reluctant to grant the right
to sublicense the content, except as part of the whole product.29
They may want to limit the developer to a single computer plat-
form.4 ' Most importantly, the agreement should include a clause
that reserves "all other rights and media not expressly granted in
this license agreement., 43  The decision whether to include this
reservation is critical for both the licensor and the licensee because
case law has granted licensees the rights to media known but not
contemplated at the time of the agreement. 32
A. Individual Licenses
The typical license is the individually negotiated license in
which the owner grants the licensee the right to certain property
for a particular use for a specified period of time in a defined terri-
tory.4" The right to manufacture a patented medicine in the
United States, the right to produce a play in a theatre, the right to
reproduce a book in paperback form, are all examples of indi-
vidually negotiated licenses. Licenses are largely a matter of con-
tract law rather than intellectual property law.'" The individually
negotiated license between the creator and the user is the purest
form of creator-controlled exploitation envisioned by the Consti-
426. d at 6; see infra note 134 and accompanying text.
427. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 7-8.
428. Id at 7.
429. See id at 8.
430. SCOTT, supra note 26, § 1.03. Most developers have not had the ability to suc-
cessfully develop products for more than one platform whether it was set-top or desk-top,
so it has been important that rights be licensed for the Macintosh only, for the PC only, or
for some other platform only, thereby preserving the creator's ability to license the other
markets as well. Id
431. Id
432. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir.) ("If the words
are broad enough to cover the new use, it seems fairer that the burden of framing and ne-
gotiating an exception should fall on the grantor" of the license).
433. See generally O'Connell, supra note 14, at 5-11 (discussing licensing multimedia
content).
434. The Copyright Act of 1976 includes some provisions relating to compulsory and
mechanical licenses, but these are not individual licenses and are discussed in Part V.B.,
infra.
November 1996]
266 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tution" In the case of a mass use, this form is impracticable, and
one is left with a choice between a statutory or nonvoluntary li-
cense administered by the government and some type of blanket
license administered by a private collective.4 6
B. Nonvoluntary Licensing
Some licenses, known as statutory, compulsory, or nonvolun-
tary licenses, are designated by law.4' The fees for this kind of li-
cense are set by the government and usually cover arenas where
the free market system is not working well.438 User groups usually
favor statutory or compulsory licenses because these prevent rights
holders from refusing to license their works.439 The mandatory na-
ture of these licenses assures the greatest access to the widest rep-
ertoire of content, and dramatically slashes transaction costs by
creating a statutory clearinghouse.'" Users in favor of a compul-
sory licensing scheme argue that private licensing is impractica-
ble,"' that it is necessary to have full and unrestricted access to all
creative works,"2 and that compulsory licensing is necessary to as-
sure market equity. 3
Advocates of compulsory licenses confront strong legal and
policy arguments against the implementation of a nonvoluntary
system. Congress views compulsory licenses as a last resort and
imposes them only when market forces truly fail.'" The United
States and the international majority regard intellectual property
435. See infra Part 111.A.1-2.
436. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 1.1.2.
437. DRATLER, supra note 253, § 3.03.
438. See id
439. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, §§ 8.1, 8.2; see also Brenner, supra note 187, at
230 (suggesting a period of "voluntary compulsory" license terms as a necessary prereq-
uisite to the development of the multimedia industry).
440. ScoTr, supra note 26, § 22.08[C.
441. See Brenner, supra note 187, at 230.
442. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 8.2.2.
443. Id § 8.2.3. Some advocates of complete access even contend that compulsory li-
censes are unconstitutional because the rights granted to the author under such a system
are not exclusive, contrary to the Constitution's exclusive grant. See 1 NIMMER, supra
note 63, § 1.07. This argument fails to distinguish between words of authority and words
of limitation. Article I, section 8 grants Congress the authority to enact "necessary and
proper" laws, but it does not require Congress to enact only those laws that fully exploit
federal power. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973); Deepsouth Packing
Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,530-31 (1972); 1 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 1.07.
444. DRATLER, supra note 253, § 3.03[2](b).
[Vol. 30:215
MULTIMEDIA LICENSING
rights as private ownership rights. 5 Statutory licensing substan-
tially or completely invades the owners' domain by stripping own-
ers of the right and ability to control and exploit their work.'
There must be substantial reasons to overcome such weighty pub-
lic policy rationales and interfere with the creator's right to exploit
his work. Consequently, there is a strong tendency to maintain
these rights privately.447 This tendency is not, however, absolute.
The Copyright Act defines several compulsory licenses, among
them: cable and satellite retransmission rights;-' public television
transmission rights; 49 mechanical reproduction rights in music-'
so
digital audio recording rights;45' and jukebox performance rights.4'
There is another, more mundane, reason to maintain private
licensing. Statutory license terms cannot be changed in the ab-
sence of a legislative act. In the United States, this translates to an
act of Congress. Congress is not known for its efficiency. A bill to
change the rate structure of a compulsory license may become
bogged down with amendments or used as a bargaining chip for
the passage of some more controversial measure, thereby delaying
or even eliminating desired changes to the license statute.453 Fur-
ther, the law is slow to react to changes in technology. Where li-
censing is subject to a statutory scheme, political caprice may de-
prive owners of income from variant uses, or deprive users of the
ability to fully exploit emerging tools and products.4s4 A statutory
scheme may also contribute to the expansion of government power
in private enterprise.
Statutory licensing is not the only route to solving problems of
practicability, access, and market equity. Collective administra-
tions and blanket licensing can resolve these problems while main-
445. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); Berne, supra note 217, arts. 11 bis, 3(1), 14 ter;
Uniform Copyright Convention, arts. IV his, V; GATT, supra note 130, art. 69. GAIT
provisions on intellectual property generally follow the principles laid out in Berne , but
contain the full enforcement mechanisms of the treaty. Id.
446. See Smith, supra note 269, at 138.
447. See generally, SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 1.2.1 (discussing private rights
protection).
448. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 111(a)(4), (c), (d), 119 (West & Supp. 1996).
449. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (1994).
450. 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (West & Supp. 1996).
451. Id. 99 1001-1004 (West & Supp. 1996).
452. Id- § 116 (West Supp. 1996).
453. See generally, SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 8.2-8.2.3 (discussing the ar-
guments for and against nonvoluntary licensing).
454. Id.
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taining the greatest degree of control by the rights' owner.45
C. Blanket Licensing
Blanket licenses are issued by collective administration or-
ganizations in the collective's name, and allow the user access to
the collective's entire repertoire without prior notice.456 Collec-
tives can issue blanket licenses because fees and royalties are
based on something other than specific use.4' Blanket licenses are
typically issued only for mass uses.458 The creators and other rights
holder-members of the collective are compensated by a propor-
tional sharing of income based on the collective's sampling of uses
and extrapolation of the correct percentage of all use that each
work receives.459
Collective administration of blanket licenses clearly cannot be
defined as impracticable. It provides precisely the same function
as a collective administration under a compulsory or other statu-
tory license.' It drastically reduces transaction costs to the user
by establishing a clearinghouse.46 1 It provides efficient compensa-
tion and enforcement capacity to the rights holder and a known,
defined rate structure, which assists current and future users to
plan for use and improve market efficiency.
462
Further, a blanket license provides users complete access to
the repertoire. Collective members generally may not prohibit the
collective from licensing works in the repertoire to any specific
user." Blanket licensing thereby expands access to works and
consequently increases competition in the market.' Of course,
the collective cannot license any content not owned by its mem-
bers. Thus, access is not universal, but the benefits to both rights
holders and licensees make collectives a cost-effective means of
transmitting preexisting content.4
455. See discussion supra Part IV.A, infra Part IV.C.
456. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, §§ 8.5, 8.5.1.
457. Il
458. Id § 6.1.
459. Id §§ 8.5.1(d), 8.5.2.
460. SCOTT, supra note 26, § 22.08[C.
461. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1979).
462. Id.
463. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 26, § 8.7 (discussing access concerns).
464. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 22-23.
465. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, §§ 8.5.1(d), 8.5.2.
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1. Types of blanket license
Blanket licenses administered by private collectives come in
four variations: the socialized license, the statutory blanket license,
the unilateral or tariff blanket license, and the bilateral blanket li-
cense. " Of these types, the socialized license most invades indi-
vidual rights.' It provides no remuneration to the individual
rights holder, and in some cases the rights holder may be unaware
a license has been granted because the nature of the license makes
it impossible to track and account to the owner of the work.' The
socialized license is most appropriate when the State licenses
works that would otherwise be in the public domain-something
not done in the United States. 9 As such, the socialized license is
not an appropriate tool with which to develop a marketplace for
multimedia content.
The statutory blanket license is only slightly less invasive. In
some countries statutory licenses are administered privately, be-
coming a type of statutory blanket license.r While the rates are
set legislatively, it is appropriate to call this a blanket license be-
cause these collectives are powerful political forces and their lob-
bying activities result in the indirect negotiation of rates and oper-
ating rules on behalf of the members.' In the United States,
statutory copyright licenses are administered by the Copyright
Arbitration Panel of the Copyright Office,472 not by private collec-
tives, and so are not a true statutory blanket license. 3 Because the
statutory blanket license is alien to the American intellectual
property system, it is not an appropriate prototype for an Ameri-
can multimedia blanket license.
The unilateral or tariff blanket license is similar to the bilat-
eral blanket license in that both rate structures are negotiated be-
tween the collective and its members.4  However, they differ in
that the user has no ability to negotiate in a unilateral system.' In
a unilateral system, the collective publishes or posts rates for use,
466. Id. §§ 8.5.2-8.6.
467. Id. § 8.6.
468. Id
469. Id.
470. Id § 8.5.4.
471. Id.
472. 17 U.S.C. § 119(c)(3)(D) (1994).
473. 17 U.S.C.A. § 119 (West Supp. 1996).
474. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, §§ 8.5.2-8.5.3.
475. Id.
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whereupon any user may make use of any work in its repertoire
upon payment of, or a contract to pay, the posted rate. 6 The uni-
lateral system appears to have the advantage of a cooperative with
absolute control of prices. In reality, prices are often controlled by
governmental agencies, and the logistics of administration dictate
broad, untailored licensing terms and definitions.4" Additionally,
because licenses are not negotiated with the user, the collective
may be less aware of, or able to detect and enforce against, in-
fringement.
Bilateral blanket licenses are negotiated first between the
collective and the affiliate member, and second between the col-
lective and the user.7 These licenses can be negotiated per year,
per program, per occasion, or for a particular performance. 9 Al-
though the U.S. government has placed some limitations on the
types of licenses available for television performance rights,"' in
theory a license could be negotiated either for a period of time or
for a specific use, as long as individual licensing remained an op-
tion and the blanket license increased competition in the markef48
Fees for blanket licenses are based, not on the individual works
that the licensee anticipates using-because the license allows un-
limited access to the entire repertoire-but on an objective stan-
dard that reflects the value of the works to the affected industry.l2
Typically, these include such "factors as seating capacity, number
of performances being given, the form of usage, whether admission
is charged, and the overall entertainment budget of the user, or,..
it may be set as a percentage of net revenues."
4 s3
VI. COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF MULTIMEDIA LICENSING:
THE SUPERCOLLECTIVE
In order for any new collective administering multimedia li-
censes to function, it must be easy to use, have low transaction




480. See, e.g., United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers
(ASCAP 1), 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) J 56,104, at 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), (consent de-
cree) as modified by United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publish-
ers (ASCAP 1I), 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
481. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1979).




costs, reasonable and flexible license fees, a broad repertoire, and
voluntary membership. ' Rights holders want an efficient com-
pensation system, a certain amount of control, and maximum
revenue flow, while licensees want the process to be "convenient,
affordable, and democratic."' The combination of a CLO com-
posed of other collectives and a bilateral blanket licensing struc-
ture would satisfy these demands. Such a "supercollective" would
provide the multimedia industry with an instant, massive reper-
toire of available works at defined standard prices. This would
minimize transaction costs and maximize return to the rights hold-
ers.48
Because multimedia production requires such a variety of con-
tent, a super collective, at a minimum, would require the coopera-
tion of ASCAP, BMI, SESAC,' the Harry Fox Agency, AMRA,
the Copyright Clearance Center,' 9 the Motion Picture Producer's
Association of America (MPAA), the Motion Picture Export As-
sociation (MPEA) °4 Artists Rights Services, Inc. (ARS), and the
Visual Artists and Gallery Association (VAGA)" In addition,
Corbis Corp. and others that are amassing immense libraries of
digital images would have to be involved in order to gain a "one-
stop-shopping" license for multimedia.41 The combined reper-
toires of these collectives would create a vast resource for multi-
media producers, one well worth licensing.
A new, standard license incorporating content into multime-
dia would need to be negotiated between the member collectives
and ratified by their individual content owner members. Such a
license could be based on the rights already granted to the member
484. SCOTT, supra note 26, § 22.08.
485. AL
486. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C, V.C.
487. ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC administer the public performing rights in music.
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, §§ 17.9.1, 17.9.3; STEWART & SANDISON, supra note
33, at 978.
488. The Harry Fox Agency and AMRA administer the synchronization rights to mu-
sic in the United States. SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 17.9.2.
489. The Copyright Clearance Center administers reprographic rights. Id. § 19.4;
STEWART & SANDISON, supra note 33, at 978.
490. The MPAA and the MPEA administer the distribution rights to motion pictures.
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 31, § 13.6.1. They would need to be included because any
multimedia production that included clips from motion pictures would be subject to the
audiovisual distribution right. Id.
491. ARS and VAGA administer the display rights of fine, applied, and graphic artists.
Id. § 15.9.
492. See supra Part III.B, notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
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collectives. The individual collectives have already cleared these
rights in association with the uses they presently license. Such a
license would provide content users the assurance that they are not
subject to liability for infringement of content licensed in good
faith.
Persuading content owners to ratify such an agreement would
be the most difficult part of the process. However, it should be
sellable if presented as a means of extracting additional income
from rights already granted.
Furthermore, it is now possible to provide digital protection in
the form of a digital watermark or "fingerprint" embedded into
the content that can only be detected if specifically sought.4" This
technology, steganography, is proving difficult to defeat as a
tracking and enforcement tool49 and may be broad enough to pro-
tect the majority of content licensed through the collective.
Steganography could provide a valuable additional benefit for
collective members and a persuasive factor for affiliation because
it would greatly enhance the collective's ability to enforce the con-
tent owners' rights, thereby minimizing the downstream use dan-
gers inherent in digital information.
Finally, an effective industry licensing structure must account
for the enormous differences in financial resources and business
sophistication between the start-up multimedia producer and the
transnational corporation branching into multimedia. Accord-
ingly, the collective should provide at least two different licensing
structures: an annual license and a per-project license. The annual
license fee could be based on a percentage of the net profit based
on the number of units produced, a slightly higher percentage of
profits based on the number of units sold, or a middle percentage
based on the combination of units produced and wholesale price.
This scheme would favor the larger producer by ensuring a some-
what lower total price per use. An annual license is, however,
much less expensive for the collective to administer. The collec-
tive negotiates, collects, disburses, and accounts for the income on
a regular schedule, whether annually or on some other basis. Con-
sequently, the transaction costs by which the collective must re-
duce its revenues before distributing payments need not translate
into lower fees to the content owner.




The other option, a per-project license, would be aimed at the
small developer with tight cash flow and a restricted budget.
While actual cost per use might actually be higher, the higher cost
per use is reasonable because the costs associated with administer-
ing and enforcing a per-project license are higher. Further, to en-
sure availability to small and specialty producers, the license fee
could be structured as a sliding scale, based on the number of units
produced and suggested list price. The lowest cost would inure to
the smallest projects. At the upper end of the scale, the price
would equal or exceed that of an annual license. Such a sliding
scale scheme would also provide content availability for the non-
profit organization producing a multimedia product, not for sale,
but for educational or fundraising purposes. Conversely, a major
corporation planning to produce projects on an ongoing basis
would be persuaded by this pricing scheme to participate in an an-
nual license because the sliding scale fees would exceed the annual
fees for their purposes.
Disbursement of funds to the artists could be facilitated by re-
quiring the developer to include content credits in the documenta-"
tion of the project495 and to forward to the collective a single copy
of the product with documentation for sampling and archival pur-
poses. The producer would also need to report sales of licensed
products on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. The collective
should sample the market to determine sales trends thereby pro-
viding a check on inaccurate reporting. Many relevant numbers
may already be collected by industry watchdogs and might be used
in conjunction with collective sampling. Such a system would
provide fast, reliable information to the collective for the appor-
tioning of shares to the individual rights holders as members of the
supercollective affiliates.
VII. CONCLUSION
Only when there is a simple, convenient way for rights to be
handled will there be widespread use of preexisting content in digi-
tal multimedia projects. When developers no longer have to rein-
vent the wheel with each project, multimedia will have the oppor-
tunity to expand and fill its place among the emerging
495. This could be implemented in an "About This Product" file such as those which
carry the copyright information on a word processing program, or within the program it-
self.
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technologies. Quality and complexity will improve because pre-
cious resources now spent on creation of new content or on the
harrowing process of individually clearing rights to each work will
be available for the development of the technology and the re-
finement of the art.4" The collective administration of blanket
multimedia licenses will improve market efficiency, boost compe-
tition, and create opportunities at a time when creation of new
capital is at a serious ebb.
Fara Daun*
496. For example, Corbis Corp. has produced three critically acclaimed multimedia
projects-A Passion for Art: Renoir, Cezanne, Matisse & Dr. Barnes; Critical Mass; and
Volcanoes: Life on the Edge-and has gained a reputation for high quality work. Corbis'
acquisition of the Ansel Adams rights was directly due to the quality of A Passion For
Art. Baker, supra note 265, at 6. None of these projects would have been possible with-
out access to Corbis' gargantuan library of high quality images.
* This Comment is dedicated to Jeremy Osher, without whom it could never have
happened. The author wishes to thank Professors Ann Jones and Robert Rotstein for
their careful reading, constructive comments, and encouragement; Denise Singleton and
Laurie Hopkins for their thorough edits and support; Andy Baum, Oral Caglar, Karen
Kupetz, and everyone on the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their extraordinary
efforts. The author would like to express special appreciation to her family for their un-
failing love and absolute support.
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